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Governments in industrialised countries often resort to direct interventions to alter
the structure of the economy and correct market failures. Existing literature in economics
has found theoretical and empirical evidence both against and for the case of such policies
(Pack and Saggi, 2006). On the other hand, political scientists and economists have often
been concerned about the tactical distribution of public funds (Besley and Case, 1995). In
this thesis I link these two literatures by using novel datasets and quasi-experimental quan-
titative methods to understand how public funds may be actually distributed in practice.
In the first two chapters I study the allocation mechanisms of Cassa del Mezzogiorno
(CasMez), a large placed-based policy targeted at the Italian southern regions from early
1950s to the 1990s. While anecdotal evidence often refers to CasMez as a policy extremely
exposed to clientelistic pressures, no quantitative evidence has been provided yet. I recon-
struct, to my knowledge for the first time, the allocation of CasMez at the micro level and
investigate the mechanisms behind it.
In Chapter 1, I study the political determinants of the allocation of resources in
the first years of CasMez activity. By looking at close electoral races in the local elections
of 1951-52, I employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to test whether alignment
of municipalities with the central government had an effect on the distribution of funds at
the local level in the years subsequent to the elections. The results show that the central
government used CasMez funds to swing marginal municipalities away from the opposition
in rural areas which the government considered as at political risk because of their exposure
to peasant strikes and land invasions.
In Chapter 2, I study the economic determinants of CasMez over its 40 years of
operations. To identify the causal effect of local economic shocks on the allocation of funds,
I construct a shift-share instrument and predict local economic growth rate with the weighted
average of aggregate industry-level growth rates, wherein weights are derived from the local
industry structure in the baseline period. I find that CasMez often responded to local
economic shocks by making larger investments in areas that had been growing faster and
had better growth prospects.
In Chapter 3, I shift the attention to the impact of one of the most common and
least controversial government interventions - support to Research and Development (R&D)
investments. By using balance sheet and patenting data, I investigate the effect of an R&D
programme targeted at Italian high-tech start-ups. Special features of the programme allow
me to consider the allocation of the subsidy as quasi- random and implement an RDD based
on cut-off scores assigned by an independent committee to the firms. The results suggest
that the subsidy did not increase patent applications and only had a short-run effect on









Central governments transfer large flows of resources to local jurisdictions through
intergovernmental grants, to finance sub-national spending and to implement na-
tional policies. According to recent estimates, OECD countries annually transfer
on average about 5.6% of their GDP (excluding social security transfers) to lower
tiers of government (OECD, 2016). Several economists and political scientists have
highlighted the role of favoritism (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Burgess et al., 2015)
and vote-maximisation behaviour of politicians (Wright, 1974; Dixit and Londregan,
1996) in the allocation of these transfers. More specifically, a large body of litera-
ture has identified the crucial role of partisan alignment between local constituencies
and the central government, finding evidence in favour of it across various countries
(Levitt and Snyder Jr, 1995; Veiga and Pinho, 2007; Arulampalam et al., 2009;
Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Bracco et al., 2015). The theoretical foundation for
partisan alignmennt builds on the literature pertaining to distributive politics (Cox
and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996) and
highlights two crucial elements. Firstly, the central government can use transfers to
increase its re-election probabilities by targeting voters with weak partisan attach-
ment (swing voters). Secondly, incumbents in local governments can claim a share
of the political credit for the transfers. As a result, central governments will transfer
more resources to aligned local jurisdictions rather than to unaligned ones so as to
prevent the opposition from getting any political merit.
However, not all transfers generate political credit spillovers. For example,
this is the case of ad-hoc policies such as place-based policies. Usually not part of the
cyclical transfers typical of fiscal decentralisation, these interventions are designed to
temporarily respond to particular local inefficiencies or emergency situations follow-
ing natural disasters. While these policies are very common and many studies have
evaluated their outcomes1, very little is known about the political determinants of
their allocation. Even though their design is noticeably discretionary, these policies
1See among others, Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013), Kline and Moretti (2014a) or Becker,
Egger, and von Ehrlich (2012).
2
tend to be earmarked and thus committed to economic criteria. In addition to that,
ad-hoc policies are often unmistakably government-related and opposition parties
might not be able (or willing) to claim any political credit for them. It is then at
best unclear whether the results of the literature on distributive politics would also
apply to them.
In this paper I study how alignment of municipalities with the central gov-
ernment affected the allocation of funds of a large place-based development policy
in post-WWII Italy, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (henceforth, CasMez). CasMez was a
development agency created in the second half of 1950 with the aim of implement-
ing a 10-year plan to build key infrastructures (such as land reclamation, aqueducts
and roads) in the poorer regions of southern Italy. Contrary to initial intentions,
its mandate was renewed multiple times and the activity of CasMez lasted until
1993. Importantly, the central government led by the Christian Democracy party
(henceforth, DC), created CasMez to achieve not only developmental objectives but
also political aims. In fact, DC considered CasMez as an opportunity to increase its
support in the South and to fight the rise of the communist party, with assistance
from the US government (Marzotto and Schachter, 1983; Pellè, 2009; Mangullo,
2015). Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and novel datasets, I quan-
tify the impact of the results of local elections in 1951-52 on the allocation of the
first infrastructural projects funded by CasMez. While my findings do not suggest
an overall alignment effect, they do demonstrate the coexistence of alignment and
un-alignment effects in different groups of municipalities.
CasMez represents a particularly compelling case study to test distributive
politics for a variety of reasons. First of all, this intervention had deep ideological
roots. After WWII, the historical gap between the North and the South of Italy had
expanded dramatically so that GDP per capita in most of southern regions was only
half of the national GDP (Daniele and Malanima, 2007). As a consequence, anti-
governmental sentiment was rife in the South especially in rural areas. By the end of
the 1940s, land invasions and peasants strikes supported by the Italian communist
party (PCI) had dramatically increased (Barucci, 1978). With this development
3
intervention, the central government identified the chance to defend and increase its
support in the South. This transpired with the strong backing of the US government
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), to the
extent that 50 percent of CasMez’ starting endowment was funded through the
European Recovery Program Fund (Pellè, 2009). PCI was in fact, at the time, the
largest Communist party in Western Europe and Italy was thus a crucial ally for the
US (Urban, 1986). In its oppositional role in the parliament, PCI was openly critical
of CasMez for both its association with the US and its Big Push strategy (Pellè,
2009; Lepore, 2014). Crucially then, CasMez was branded by the DC government
and it plausibly had no political credit spillover favouring the opposition.
A second feature that makes this intervention an interesting case study is
its operational structure. CasMez was conceived as an autonomous body with legal
personality and technical skills, partially mimicking the experience of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). However, it was not completely independent from political
pressures: its members were nominated by the government and the development
strategies were designed at the parliamentary or governmental level (Svimez, 2015).
Also, the detailed administration and execution of the projects was in the hands
of appointed existing agencies, usually provincial or regional departments. Finally,
the intervention was conceived of as a multiyear programme but ultimately came
to be structured as a series of one-year plans. These characteristics in combination
with the temporary nature of CasMez made this intervention discretionary to a
substantial extent2.
The final feature of this case which makes it ideal for testing distributive
politics is the simultaneity between the beginning of CasMez activity and the local
elections of 1951-52. Importantly, these elections were extremely salient as they
happened between the very first3 parliamentary elections of 1948 and the upcoming
2Scholars tend to describe the first years of CasMez activity as the golden age of this intervention,
especially in terms of independence from the government with respect to the period after 1965, when
different law changes allowed for more supervision by the government and the parliament (Cafiero,
2000; Felice and Lepore, 2017; Podbielski, 1978). However, CasMez’ substantial discretionary nature
was recognized also by CasMez own director (Pescatore, 1961).
3The Italian Republic had only become a democracy two years earlier, in 1946, after WWII and
20 years of fascist dictatorship. Young democracies are also typically thought as being more prone
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ones of 1953. In particular, DC, after the strong victory obtained in the 1948
elections, with 48% of overall votes, was concerned about the impact that increasing
support for communist and monarchic parties would have on the 1953 elections
(Possanzini, 2000). As a matter of fact, DC lost an overall 13 percentage points of
support in the 1951-52 local elections and its political strategy was so affected that
the government pushed for the adoption of a new electoral law that would guarantee
them a majority bonus in the upcoming parliamentary elections4. DC undoubtedly
perceived the results of 1951-52 local elections as a crucial Litmus test according to
which it could redesign its political strategy (Corbetta and Piretti, 2009).
To analyse the political determinants of the allocation of CasMez’ funds, I
construct a novel municipality-level data of the projects funded by CasMez in its
first years of activity. The empirical identification of the causal effect of electoral re-
sults on allocation of transfers is demanding. This is because several socio-economic
factors such as pre-existing corruption levels or income can influence both dimen-
sions. I employ an RDD and compare the allocation of funds in municipalities where
DC won by a small margin to municipalities where DC lost by a small margin. The
baseline results indicate no statistically significant evidence for an alignment effect
on the money allocated by CasMez to the municipalities where DC had just won
within 5 years subsequent to the elections. Additionally, I find no effect on the
quantity and the average size of projects funded by CasMez. The results are robust
across a wide range of parametric and non-parametric specifications. To explore the
potential mechanisms behind these results, I first look at close electoral races for
PCI to test for the presence of un-alignment effect. I find that unaligned municipal-
ities, where PCI had just won were 20% more likely to be targeted by CasMez than
municipalities where PCI had just lost.
In the light of these findings, I re-examine the baseline results by splitting
municipalities into agricultural areas which were particularly perceived to be at risk
of Communist land occupations and non-agricultural areas. This analysis reveals
to corruption and clientelism, see for instance Keefer (2007) or Veiga and Pinho (2007).
4The ad-hoc nature of this law was harshly criticised, to the point that it was called the scam
law.
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that the baseline null-results were masking an important heterogeneity, namely the
coexistence of alignment and un-alignment effects in different subsamples. In par-
ticular, I find that while urban municipalities received more money if aligned, the
opposite was true for rural municipalities. Additional analysis also shows that the
effect is mainly identifiable on the extensive margin. A potential explanation of
these results is that rural areas were considered at greater risk by DC because of
their exposure to peasant strikes and land invasions. Thus, given the absence of
political credit spillovers, DC might have used CasMez funds to swing marginal
municipalities away from the opposition. For urban areas, instead, the typical par-
tisan alignment model predictions would apply and DC might have used the funds
to reward its supporters, to build party strongholds or to support the rent-seeking
behaviour of the notables. Overall, I conclude that research on distributive politics
might benefit from considering the role that absence of political credit spillovers and
other important political features of the constituencies such as political instability
can play.
This paper builds on the seminal literature on distributive politics (Cox and
McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996)5. In
particular, it contributes to the expanding literature on the effects of political align-
ment (see, amongst others: Levitt and Snyder Jr, 1995; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa,
2006; Veiga and Pinho, 2007; Arulampalam et al., 2009; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012;
Johansson, 2003; Albouy, 2013; Bracco et al., 2015; Muraközy and Telegdy, 2016;
Baskaran and Hessami, 2017).
Three works are very close to the current study as they provide the crucial
theoretical framework that motivates this paper. Arulampalam et al. (2009), Brollo
and Nannicini (2012) and Bracco et al. (2015) all present theoretical models that
rely crucially on the presence of political credit spillovers of central transfers that
5Briefly, scholars have put forward two contrasting views based on different hypotheses about
which voters are more likely to be responsive to distributive benefits and thus more likely to be
targeted by governmental transfers. The classic machine politics argument, as in Cox and Mc-
Cubbins (1986), is that risk-averse politicians should prefer to target their core base of supporters.
The alternative model, the swing-voters model, (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan,
1996) predicts that parties target election districts with a largest share of ideologically indifferent
voters, who can change the electoral results at the margin.
6
can be shared by the local unaligned incumbent. The model proposed by Brollo
and Nannicini (2012) predicts that there is no tactical distribution in the absence of
political credit spillovers. Arulampalam et al. (2009) and Bracco et al. (2015) obtain
alignment effects in their models when the increased voter utility or goodwill of the
transfers goes to the non-aligned incumbent. Particularly in Arulampalam et al.
(2009), the share of goodwill going to the incumbent must be large enough (greater
than a half) and is taken as exogenous for the alignment effect to arise. On the other
hand, Bracco et al. (2015) endogenise this share and obtain that the incumbent takes
full credit for the transfers (i.e., the share is equal to 1). I complement the results
of these works by testing the alignment effect in the context of an ad-hoc policy,
in which the share of goodwill that the unaligned incumbent can take credit for is
plausibly equal to zero.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to look at the effect of
alignment on transfers from whence political credit spillovers can be ruled out. A
few papers investigated the political determinants of place-based policies. Muraközy
and Telegdy (2016) and Dellmuth and Stoffel (2012) looked at the EU structural
funds and found positive alignment effects in Hungary and Germany respectively.
However, the context of the EU funds is very different from the one proposed in this
paper as local authorities can initiate the application for funds. This means that
local politicians can influence the allocation process by determining the demand for
funds. Moreover, the budget and eligibility criteria of EU funds are defined at the
supranational level by the European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union.
Overall, most of the recent empirical literature on political alignment has
identified a positive alignment effect of fiscal transfers in several countries. Based
on the literature surveyed, only two papers have not found evidence for an alignment
effect. Ward and John (1999) report that in one specific year in England the central
government transferred more grants to marginal local authorities held by the party
of the opposition. Owing to advances in empirical methods, this current study
provides a more robust identification through RDD. Baskaran and Hessami (2017)
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also used an RDD and found that budget support transfers are used by a German
state in very heterogeneous ways and observed an alignment effect only in periods
when the state government has more local support. Their results parallel mine as
they show that the effect of alignment varies according to local political conditions.
However, the role of political credit spillover is unclear in their analysis.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on post-WWII Italy and
CasMez. In particular, Marzotto and Schachter (1983) looked at CasMez invest-
ments over its first 25 years of activity and investigated their relationship with local
electoral behaviour. Using a random sample of municipalities, they provided quali-
tative evidence that DC-core electoral districts were least likely to receive economic
rewards. My work builds on theirs by providing quantitative evidence6 and focusing
on swing municipalities. A growing body of research has recently looked at CasMez,
especially from a historical point of view (Lepore, 2014; Felice and Lepore, 2017;
d’Adda and de Blasio, 2017). I contribute to this literature by providing the first
quantitative test of the political determinants of CasMez allocations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes
the political background against which CasMez functioned and the elections were
held. Section 1.3 describes the dataset and the main variables of interest. Section
1.4 describes the identification strategy and provides some evidence for its validity
in this setup. Section 1.5 shows the main results. Section 1.6 presents additional
results and discusses the mechanisms and the final section furnishes the conclusion
to the paper.
1.2 Institutional background
This section provides more details about the origins of CasMez, the role it played
in the propaganda of DC and the political salience of 1951-52 local elections. After
6To my knowledge, the only other paper that empirically looks at distributive politics in postwar
Italy is Golden and Picci (2008). However, they do not look at the alignment effect. In fact, they
study how the results of the parliamentary elections affect infrastructural transfers (unrelated to
CasMez) from the central government to provinces. Through a panel estimation, they show that
individually powerful deputies tend to target their core constituents.
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WWII, and 20 years of fascist dictatorship, Italy became a Republic in 1946 following
a national referendum wherein 54% of the voters picked the Republic against the
Monarchy as the system of government. The initial years of the Republic were deeply
influenced by the cold-war confrontation. The first parliamentary elections of 1948
showed an extremely polarised country: the Christian Democratic party (DC) and
Communist-Socialist coalition (FDP)7 alone obtained almost 80% of the votes. The
electoral campaign8 was almost totally focused on the blocks-confrontation and led
DC to win with 48% of the votes (Corbetta and Piretti, 2009).
In the meantime, the gap between the North and the South of the country
dramatically widened9. Structural economic differences had been made worse by the
damages wrought by the war (Pellè, 2009). Also, the southern regions benefitted
very little from the funds of the European Recovery Program (Fauri, 2010). The
DC government started considering this issue especially due to the emergent social
tensions in the agricultural sector. These were seen as a threat to the political sta-
bility of the country and to its integration in the Western bloc (Crafts and Magnani,
2013).
It is against this background that DC which was strongly supported by the
IBRD decided to actively encourage the development of the southern regions with
an intervento strardinario, i.e. special intervention. The main instrument of this
policy was the creation of an independent funding agency which was modelled after
the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the US and designated to
implement highly technical infrastructural projects to push market forces to generate
the development of the South10.
Understanding the political motives behind the creation of CasMez is ex-
7This coalition was created for these elections, after which Communists and Socialists started
running as two different parties,PCI and PSI.
8See figure 1.31 in Appendix 1.C.3.
9Scholars of different disciplines have been studying the North-South divide, the southern ques-
tion, extensively and are far away from having reached a common view. However, most of them
agree that the institutional and economic differences before unification in 1861 have played a crucial
role (for a recent discussion on this see Federico and Vasta, 2017).
10Even if a causal relationship has not been established yet, scholars tend to agree that CasMez
contributed to the unique phenomenon of convergence between southern and northern regions
between 1951 and 1971 (Felice, 2015; Podbielski, 1978; Crafts and Magnani, 2013).
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tremely pertinent to interpreting the results of this paper. An internal IBRD re-
port(WB, 1951)11 leaves no ambiguity about the existence of these motives:
While the development of the south is an old issue in Italy, [...] the
current development program [..] was authorized in an effort to counter
the plans proposed by the communists and to increase, if possible, the
political prestige of the Government in these areas.
The intervention was also included in the propaganda of DC, especially
against the communist party (PCI), as figures 1.1 and 1.32 show.
Most importantly, the opposition parties identified in this intervention, at
least in the very first years, the attempt of DC to increase its support and the
intention of the US government to retain Italy on its side. Two extracts from
parliamentary speeches12 of two MPs, Giorgio Amendola and Mario Alicata, from
PCI are self-explanatory with regard to this issue:
[...] We can very well foresee what this CasMez will do to all economic,
social and political sectors in the Italian south. It is a powerful tool of
electoral and political corruption that you want to put up, for your own
party’s interests, to establish the empire of your regime in the Italian
south.
[..] It is an instrument to penetrate the American capital and influence
into the South. [..]. this American inspiration behind CasMez is a threat
for the South.
In particular, most of the political tension around this intervention was re-
lated to the rural areas. As a matter of fact, the majority of funds were initially
related to large investments for roads, aqueducts and land reclamation and thus tar-
geted at agricultural areas which constituted a large share of the southern regions13.
11See Appendix 1.C.1 for full text.
12See Appendix 1.C.2 for full texts.
13At the end of the 1940s, 34% of GDP in the South was coming from agriculture, against 19%
in the Centre-North (Podbielski, 1978).
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Figure 1.1: DC’s propaganda. The poster says : “Facts speak:
1280 billions for Mezzogiorno”, “Reconstruction in Italy has a
name: Democrazia Cristiana” and “Vote”
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Bernardi (2006) highlights that one of the reasons why the actual areas of interven-
tion were not established when CasMez was created was to prevent communists
from encouraging peasants to occupy target lands.
In this context, the local elections of 1951-52 were very important for DC so
as to test its level of support, especially in the South, after the big victory of 1946.
These elections were supposed to take place in 1950 and were even postponed14
to allow the parliament to modify the electoral system first. The original electoral
system, used in the 1946 local elections, was proportional for municipalities with less
than 30 thousands inhabitants and majoritarian for the larger ones15. The change
was mainly based on the extension of a majoritarian rule to smaller municipalities.
DC was trying to test the transition from a proportional to majoritarian system that
would subsequently be proposed for adoption in the 1953 parliamentary elections
with the intention being to maintain a strong control of the parliament thanks to a
majority bonus.
1.3 Data
This analysis is based on three main data sources: the CasMez project-level dataset,
the results of the 1951-52 local elections and the Industry and Population censuses
from 1951. The data for CasMez has been provided by the Ministry for Economic
Development and includes information on timing, location, size and types of the
universe of projects funded by CasMez. To merge this information with the census
data, I aggregate the projects to the municipality level and reconstruct the borders
of municipalities as of 1951. While almost 90% of the projects are matched to a
single municipality in the Ministry’s database, 48% of the total funds are coded
as being targeted to public works projects referred to as pluricomunali, i.e. multi-
municipality. For those multi-municipality projects for which a list of targeted
14Law 255/1950.
15More specifically: municipalities with less than 30 thousand inhabitants had a proportional
system with D’Hondt method for the allocation of seats. This system was also applied to province-
capital municipalities, i.e. the main municipality within a province, where p.a. offices at province
level are usually located. Municipalities with more than 30 thousands inhabitants had instead a
majoritarian system with block voting.
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Figure 1.2: CasMez money and number of projects in the first decade
for public works, by target. The patterns of the lines depend on the target of
the projects: dashed lines measure single-municipality projects, while solid lines
measure multi-municipality projects. Colours depend on the metric used. Black
is for the money invested, measured on the left axis and grey is for the number
of projects, measured on the right axis. Funds in each year are measured as any
funds allocated during that calendar year.
locations is not available, I have extracted location names and other geographical
references from other fields of the project entry16. For each municipality, I can
then reconstruct the number of projects and the cumulated money received up to 5
years after the elections had taken place. All monetary values are converted to their
2011 value, using reconversion coefficients provided by the Italian Statistical Office
(ISTAT).
Figure 1.2 shows how CasMez intervention evolved during the first years of
its activity. In particular, the chart shows that: i) most of the projects in this period
are multi-municipality projects and ii) the trends in amount of money and number
of projects are very similar17.
The Population census provides the count of residents and other demograph-
16More details on how I allocate these projects and on the data cleaning process in general can
be found in the Appendix to Chapter 2 of this thesis.
17See also Appendix 1.A for figures 1.12 and 1.13. The former shows the trend in CasMez money
over years, comparing the measure with and without multi-municipality projects. The latter zooms
into the period studied in this paper, showing how multi-municipality projects consisted of a large
share of overall projects.
13
ics, such as literacy level, household conditions and, most importantly, residents
active in agriculture. The Industry census provides the number of employees in
each municipality, excluding the following sectors: agriculture and fishing, educa-
tion, health services and public administration.
The results from the administrative elections have been collected from sta-
tistical publications18 of the Elections Department of the Ministry of Interior and
then digitised. As the electoral system was slightly different for different population
thresholds, this paper only focuses on municipalities with less than 10 thousands
inhabitants as they make up to 90% of the Italian municipalities in the period under
study. The electoral system for municipalities with less than 10 thousands inhab-
itants and maximum 20 seats in the local council19 was majoritarian with limited
vote20. In this system, each voter can cast a vote for candidates (but not the list
they belong to) but the maximum amount of votes she can cast is equal to 4/5
of the total number of seats21. The seats of the local council are allocated to the
candidates with the highest number of votes. As the system is parliamentary, the
mayor is elected by the council members after the elections.
For each list in a given municipality, the publication reports22 the estimated
number of votes received and seats won. The votes are estimated because electors
cast votes for candidates and not for lists. In order to approximate and measure sup-
port to lists or parties the publication reports the arithmetic mean of the preferences
given to all candidates in that list. This is computed as the ratio between the total
number of votes the list received and the number of candidates in the list. However,
this metric is problematic for measuring the strength of different candidates within
18For municipalities above 10 thousands inhabitants: Ministero dell’Interno - Divisione Servizi
Elettorali - Direzione Generale dell’Amministrazione Civile (1954a) and Ministero dell’Interno -
Divisione Servizi Elettorali - Direzione Generale dell’Amministrazione Civile (1954b). For mu-
nicipalities below 10 thousands inhabitants: Ministero dell’Interno - Divisione Servizi Elettorali -
Direzione Generale dell’Amministrazione Civile (1954c).
19Sicily had its own electoral system and is for this reason excluded from the analysis.
20Larger municipalities had a majority premium with the possibility of coalitions. The voter
would cast the vote to the list or coalition and the list with relative majority would get then 2/3
of the seats.
21The rationale of this system is to have minorities represented by preventing the majoritarian
party from having all the council seats.
22See figure 3.2 in Appendix 1.A.1
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Table 1.1: Winning Parties and votes’ distribution
Seats’ Majority
Votes’ Majority PCI-PSI C-Left Centre DC DC Others Right Others Ind Total
PCI-PSI 390 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 396
C-Left 0 20 0 1 0 0 0 0 21
Centre 0 0 70 1 0 0 0 0 71
DC 4 0 2 649 1 3 1 0 660
DC Others 6 0 0 1 593 0 2 1 603
Right 1 0 0 3 1 148 0 0 153
Others 3 1 0 1 1 0 148 0 154
Ind 4 0 0 9 6 0 0 174 193
Total 408 21 72 667 605 152 151 175 2,251
Notes: The table reports the counts of municipalities where each party won the majority of seats or votes.
The sample includes all digitized elections for municipalities targeted by CasMez and thus differ from
the sample of the analysis. Parties are as follows: PCI-PSI is the Communists (PCI) and Socialists (PSI)
coalition, C-Left includes the more centre-wing of the socialist party (PSLI), and several social-democratic
parties (PSDI, PSULI, PSU) and often the republican party (PRI). Centre includes all Centre’s parties,
excluding DC, that is mainly the liberals (PLI).
the same list, especially as coalitions including candidates with different political
views are quite common in small municipalities. Most importantly, two particular
cases can arise: i) coalition A can obtain more votes than coalition B but coalition
B ends up with more seats because more candidates have lots of preferences and ii)
estimated votes can end up being greater or equal than the number of voters if there
are incomplete lists or if the allocation of seats occurs considering also subdivisions
of municipalities. However, such cases rarely transpire and so do not constitute a
concern. Table 1.1 shows that case i) does not happen very frequently and case ii)
only happens in 5% of all municipalities in southern regions.
Excluding Sicily which had its own electoral system, four invalid elections, lo-
cal elections occurring in 1953 or later23 there are overall 1736 municipalities across
8 southern regions24. As the identification strategy relies on the comparison between
municipalities where DC just won and municipalities where it just lost, I restrict
the sample to electoral races in which one of the first two lists was aligned with
the central government, i.e. DC. This restricts the sample to 1522 municipalities.
However, in local elections, DC would often run with coalitions, usually with liber-
23Only 10% of the elections occurred in 1953 or later.
24I also exclude municipalities that are in regions that are not part of the South and were targeted
by CasMez only to a minimal extent: Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Toscana and Umbria. The results
are anyways robust to their inclusion in the dataset.
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als and republicans with distinguishably different political views. To look at pure
political alignment then I restrict the sample to municipalities where DC is running
alone. The final sample with municipalities where DC is running alone consists of
794 municipalities. Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 show basic summary statistics in these
three samples. On average, these samples do not differ significantly.
The main outcome variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
(henceforth, Arcsinh) of funds targeted to municipalities. I use the Arcsinh trans-
formation, as suggested by Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988), to reduce the influ-
ence of extreme values but especially also retain all zero values25 I also construct
additional measures of the intervention. First, to estimate the effect on the exten-
sive margin I construct an indicator variable equal to one when the municipality
was targeted at least once. Secondly, to test the alignment effect on the quantity
of projects I construct the number of projects every 1000 inhabitants, using the
resident population in 1951. Finally, I measure the average size of the projects in a
municipality by dividing the total funds by the number of projects. I then measure
these variables in different years after the elections. As the standard term for the
municipality council and the mayor was four years, I look at results for up to 5
years after the election to investigate whether there is suggestible evidence about
the effect of the 1956 local elections.
1.4 Identification Strategy
1.4.1 Fuzzy RDD
The main challenge to empirically identify the causal effect of alignment on the
allocation of funds is selection bias. The distribution of political preferences is de-
termined by several factors and thus municipalities aligned with the central govern-
ment are noticeably different from unaligned ones. The effect of alignment cannot
be disentangled by the effect of other cofounders through a mere comparison be-
tween the money allocated in aligned and unaligned municipalities. This paper
25Except for very small values, the inverse sine is approximately equal to log2y. Results are
robust to the use of log(1+y).
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics (All races)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dummy if targeted by CasMez up 4 years after elections 0.63 0.48 0 1 1736
Log of money allocated up to 4 years after elections 8.72 6.73 0 18.66 1736
Number of projects every 1000 inhabitants 0.78 1.14 0 12.01 1736
Average project size, thousand euros (PPP) 308.62 1080.3 0 31706.99 1736
Industrial jobs per capita 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.53 1736
Illiteracy rate 0.28 0.09 0.03 0.70 1736
Log of population 7.72 0.65 5.46 10.18 1736
Plants per capita 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.14 1736
% of population active in agriculture 0.39 0.14 0.03 0.84 1736
% of households with kitchens in 1951 0.95 0.08 0.36 1 1736
% of households with electricity in 1951 0.63 0.24 0 0.99 1736
% of households with no water/electricity 0.01 0.02 0 0.32 1736
Turnout at elections 86.92 6.54 52.7 98 1736
Votes’ share of DC (also if in coalition) 0.47 0.23 0 1 1736
Votes’ share of PCI 0.2 0.21 0 0.93 1736
Votes’ share of right wing coalitions 0.09 0.17 0 1 1736
Table 1.3: Summary statistics (DC races: coalitions)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dummy if targeted by CasMez up 4 years after elections 0.64 0.48 0 1 1521
Log of money allocated up to 4 years after elections 8.75 6.73 0 18.66 1521
Number of projects every 1000 inhabitants 0.79 1.15 0 12.01 1521
Average project size, thousand euros (PPP) 315 1135.31 0 31706.99 1521
Industrial jobs per capita 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.53 1521
Illiteracy rate 0.28 0.09 0.03 0.70 1521
Log of population 7.71 0.65 5.46 9.15 1521
Plants per capita 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.11 1521
% of population active in agriculture 0.4 0.14 0.03 0.84 1521
% of households with kitchens in 1951 0.95 0.08 0.36 1 1521
% of households with electricity in 1951 0.62 0.24 0 0.99 1521
% of households with no water/electricity 0.01 0.03 0 0.32 1521
Turnout at elections 86.95 6.53 52.7 98 1521
Votes’ share of DC (also if in coalition) 0.53 0.17 0.09 1 1521
Votes’ share of PCI 0.2 0.21 0 0.72 1521
Votes’ share of right wing coalitions 0.09 0.16 0 0.84 1521
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics (DC races: no coalition)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dummy if targeted by CasMez up 4 years after elections 0.62 0.49 0 1 794
Log of money allocated up to 4 years after elections 8.44 6.75 0 17.75 794
Number of projects every 1000 inhabitants 0.78 1.16 0 10.4 794
Average project size, thousand euros (PPP) 0.26 0.58 0 7.58 794
Industrial jobs per capita 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.49 794
Illiteracy rate 0.28 0.1 0.03 0.70 794
Log of population 7.63 0.66 5.64 9.15 794
Plants per capita 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.11 794
% of population active in agriculture 0.4 0.14 0.03 0.84 794
% of households with kitchens in 1951 0.95 0.08 0.36 1 794
% of households with electricity in 1951 0.61 0.25 0 0.99 794
% of households with no water/electricity 0.01 0.02 0 0.19 794
Turnout at elections 87.26 6.41 59.3 98 794
Votes’ share of DC (no coalition) 0.52 0.16 0.09 1 794
Votes’ share of PCI 0.17 0.19 0 0.72 794
Votes’ share of right wing coalitions 0.1 0.17 0 0.84 794
provides a quasi-experimental setting to isolate this effect by looking at close elec-
tions. Analysing the causes or consequences of policy by comparing constituencies
where a party just lost to constituencies where it just won is a well established and
standard tool in political economy (Lee, Moretti, and Butler, 2004; Ferreira and
Gyourko, 2009; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). The power of this methodology lies in
the fact that, under some testable conditions, the treatment status can be thought
as being quasi-random around the cut-off so that the outcome for constituencies
below the cut-off is a proper counterfactual for the outcome of constituencies above.
Define Fi(1) as the total funds received by municipality i after the elections
if DC obtains the majority of seats in the local council and Fi(0) as the potential
funds received by the same municipality if another party wins the majority of seats.
The causal effect of alignment is defined as E[Fi(1) − Fi(0)]. Now define the votes’
margin of victory for DC (VMV) as the difference in the share of votes obtained
by DC and the share of votes obtained by the runner-up when DC wins and the
opposite when DC loses. I am interested in estimating β in the following model:
Yi = f(VMVi) + βAlignmenti + εi (1.1)
where VMV is the running variable that is related to the outcome through the
generic functional form f(.). As described in section 2.3, majority of votes does
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not always imply majority of seats. Thus, the alignment of the municipalities with
the central government is not a deterministic function of VMV and the treatment
assignment of DC having the majority of votes and the treatment status of DC
having the majority of seats do not coincide. I define the treatment assignment
dummy Zi such that Zi = 1(VMVi ≥ 0), so that municipalities are assigned to the
treatment when VMV is above the cut-off of 0. If Z is as good as randomly assigned
around the cut-off, any differences in the outcome within a narrow bandwidth can be
interpreted as the causal effect of the assignment to the treatment, γ̃ in the following
model:
Yi = f(VMVi) + γ̃1(VMV ≥ 0) + ξ̃i (1.2)
As in an IV framework, the effect of the treatment can be obtained by rescaling the
intention-to-treat (ITT) coefficient γ̃ by the change at the cut-off in the probability
of treatment. In other words, the assignment to the treatment can be used as
an instrument for the treatment itself and the coefficient of interest β is the ratio
between the reduced form and the first stage coefficient, γ from equation (1.3).





For the ratio in (1.4) to be valid, the monotonicity assumption must be satisfied. In
this context, this is very plausible as it only implies that DC having the majority of
votes does not decrease the probability of alignment. Then, the ratio in (1.4) is the
local average treatment effect (LATE) on the compliers around the cut-off.
Before estimating β, I create a set of RD plots to investigate the presence of
a discontinuity in the outcome variable around cut-off. This analysis is important
as it sheds light on the functional form linking the running variable to the outcome.
I then estimate both parametric and non-parametric regressions, in which I use Zi
as an instrument for the alignment dummy, Alignmenti. First, I allow different
polynomial orders P of the running variable on each side of the cut-off and estimate
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γk( ̂Alignmenti ∗ VMVik) + ξ̃i (1.5)
̂Alignmenti is the predicted value from a first stage regression, as in equation (1.3),
and γ0 measures the alignment effect for the observations at the cut-off. Secondly, I
restrict the sample to observations around the cut-off only and estimate a local poly-
nomial regression within different bandwidths and inference methods, as suggested
in the literature (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014).
1.4.2 Testing assumptions’ validity
The estimation of β as described in section 1.4.1 is valid only if the treatment is
as good as randomly assigned around the cut-off. To check the validity of this
assumption, I investigate whether there is evidence for manipulation of the running
variable and for relevant differences in municipality characteristics around the cut-
off.
First, I look at the density distribution of VMV to see if there is any bunching
below or above the cut-off. Empirical literature has highlighted how close elections
can often be prone to high degrees of manipulation as incumbents are very different
from other candidates especially at the cut-off (Grimmer et al., 2011; Caughey and
Sekhon, 2011)26. However, in this paper, as in Brollo and Nannicini (2012), the
running variable is the margin of victory of the aligned party and thus differences in
terms of probabilities of winning should not affect the validity of the identification
strategy. Also, the limited vote structure of the majoritarian system used in these
local elections implies that it is less clear to politicians which elections will be close
because the way to obtain the majority of seats is to have as many as possible votes
per person as possible rather than the largest possible number of votes. This prior is
confirmed by figure 1.3 that shows that the density is smooth around the cut-off and
26See however Eggers et al. (2015) for a defence of RD’s validity in close electoral races.
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Figure 1.3: Density distribution of the running variable This graph shows
the density distribution of the running variable together with the plot of kernel
density estimates.
by density tests proposed in the literature. The McCrary’s test (McCrary, 2008)
yields a t-ratio of 0.8 and the test proposed by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2017)
yields a t-ratio of 0.11. Both tests cannot reject the null of the difference in densities
at the cut-off being equal to 0.
If the treatment is as close as quasi-random assigned, municipality charac-
teristics should be balanced around the cut-off. To test this, I employ the empirical
methodology described in section 1.4.1 to conduct some falsification tests on core
observables. In particular, I look at socio and economic variables that are likely to
be correlated with both the allocation of funds and the electoral results, such as
population size, size of the agricultural sector (measured as the share of population
active in agriculture), illiteracy rate, development in terms of household infrastruc-
tures, number of industrial jobs and plants per capita.
First, I plot these variables against the running variable, VMV. Any jump at
the cut-off would signal the presence of statistically significant differences between





Figure 1.4: Covariates and margin of victory. These graphs show the average of each variable
within bins of the difference in the share of votes between DC and the main opponent party. All
metrics are based on population and industry census of 1951. The circles represent means within
10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based on
a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of the cut-off.
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Figure 1.5: Placebo regressions. These graphs show the coefficients and the
confidence intervals from the estimation of γk in equation (1.5) for each covariate
by different values of P.
plots the mean of each variable within two different sizes of bins of the running
variable27 and fits a quadratic polynomials on each side of the cut-off. All the
variables have a smooth pattern around the threshold. Secondly, I estimate the
regressions described in section 1.4.1 to check whether any statistically significant
jump can be detected at the cut-off. Figure 1.5 shows the coefficients estimated for
different polynomial orders of equation (1.5). None of the variables is significantly
correlated with the alignment dummy.
1.5 The effect of alignment of funds’ allocation
This section consists of four subsections. The first one presents the RDD graphical
analysis and the second one shows the estimation results for the main outcome. The
third section looks at alternative outcomes while the fourth one presents further
robustness checks.
27Results are similar for other bin sizes.
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1.5.1 Graphical Analysis
Figure 1.6 plots the funds allocated to municipalities after the elections against
the running variable, the votes’ margin of victory (VMV), as defined in section
1.4.1. Each graph shows the funds - measured as the inverse hyperbolic sine of
the cumulated funds - received up to x years from the year of election. The circles
represent the mean of the outcome variable within bins of 0.1 width of the running
variable to the left and right of the cut-off; the fitted lines and shaded areas represent
the fitted values and confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression
on each side of the cut-off. The graphs do not show any differences in the outcomes
between municipalities where DC just lost or just won and, even if the confidence
intervals are narrow and would lead to over-rejection.
These RD plots are very similar for different specifications of the underlying
regression, of bin size and of the outcome variable. Appendix 1.B.1 reports the
same plots with a linear or cubic fit (figures 1.17 and 1.18), with different bin sizes
(figures 1.15 and 1.16 ) and with money measured as logarithm or in per capita
levels (figures 1.19 and 1.20).
This null result might hide an alignment effect on two other dimensions.
First, projects could be targeted to aligned municipalities only (extensive margin).
To investigate this, figure 1.21 in Appendix 1.B.1 reproduces the same RD plots as
in figure 1.6 for a dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality received at least one
grant. Again, there is no significant jump at the cut-off28 so aligned municipalities
are not more likely to be targeted by CasMez than unaligned municipalities.
Even if there is no effect of alignment on the extensive margin of CasMez al-
location, there could still be one on the intensive margin. Projects could be targeted
to both aligned and unaligned municipalities, but disproportionally more to one of
the two groups. To test this, I restrict the sample to municipalities that received
at least one grant in the first year after the election. Selecting the sample on the
dependent variable can lead to selection bias in estimations and this test needs to
28Results are also robust to different polynomial orders and bin sizes. The charts are available
upon request.
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Figure 1.6: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of funds allocated
against (VMV) by years after the election. These graphs show the average
money allocated to municipalities, defined in different time periods after the
elections, conditional on the difference in the share of votes between DC and the
main opponent party or coalition. The circles represent means within 10% bins
and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals
based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of the cut-off.
be interpreted with this caveat in mind. Overall, this condition removes more than
half of the observations from the sample, thereby leaving us with 303 municipalities.
Figures 1.22 in Appendix 1.B.1 shows the RD plot on this subsample of municipali-
ties. The results indicate that also among recipients, there is no significant difference
in the grants received between areas where DC just won or just lost. Overall, RD
plots show that the alignment of municipalities with the central government does
not significantly affect the allocation of funds on either the extensive or the intensive
margin. The next section shows the results from the regressions described in section
1.4.1 which offer overall confirmation of the null result shown here.
1.5.2 Estimation
This section shows the main results derived from parametric and non-parametric
estimations of the (lack of) discontinuities presented in the previous section. First,
I estimate equation (1.5) in section 1.4.1 by allowing for a quadratic polynomial of
the running variable. The results are presented in table 1.5. As in the previous
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section, the main outcome variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
the cumulated money given to municipalities in the years following the elections. The
coefficients are all positive but not significant. A large increase in the coefficients’
magnitude occurs in the very first year after the elections (2nd column).
These results are robust to different orders of the polynomial function of
the running variable. Table 1.6 is a 5x5 matrix in which the coefficients from the
2SLS regressions are shown by year when the outcome variable is measured and by
polynomial order. The coefficients are not significant but positive and quite stable
across linear, quadratic and cubic functions of the running variable. However, the
coefficients for higher polynomials are mostly negative. This finding is in line with
the work by Gelman and Imbens (2018) who provide evidence on the noisiness
of results from higher order polynomials in RD settings and suggest focusing on
lower order polynomials or non-parametric regressions only. Moreover, as the RD
plots have shown, the relationship between the running variable and the outcome
is smooth and a higher order polynomial is likely to give a bad fit. This is also
confirmed by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which is the lowest for linear
and quadratic fits29.
All these results are similar when the outcome is measured as a logarithm or
in per capita levels (see tables 1.12 and 1.13 in Appendix 1.B). In addition, as in
the graphical analysis, there is no alignment effect either on the extensive or on the
intensive margins (see figures 1.23 and 1.24 in Appendix 1.B).
As anticipated in section 1.4.1, I also estimate the discontinuity at the cut-off
via non-parametric methods. In particular, I estimate a local linear regression within
a narrow bandwidth of the cut-off. For choosing the bandwidth, I follow the current
literature (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014;
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell, 2018). Table 1.7 shows the coefficients from local
linear regressions, with three different bandwidths30. Panel A and B provide the
results based on commonly used bandwidths selected by minimising the MSE. In
particular, I use the bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell (2018)
29Results available upon request.
30The reduced form is shown in table 1.14 in Appendix 1.B.
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Table 1.5: Quadratic polynomial IV regression: 2SLS and reduced form
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: 2SLS
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.748 1.568 1.675 1.759 1.679 0.742
(1.072) (1.079) (1.119) (1.144) (1.124) (1.096)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794 794
Klebergen-Paap F 617.1 617.1 617.1 617.1 617.1 617.1
Panel B: Reduced form
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Votes) 0.640 1.341 1.432 1.503 1.435 0.634
(0.919) (0.927) (0.963) (0.985) (0.965) (0.941)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794 794
Notes: the table reports estimates of the alignment effect from the model in equation (1.5) where the
polynomial is of order 2. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
cumulated money defined in different time periods after the elections. The assignment to the treatment,
DC wins (Votes), is the instrument for DC winning the elections, DC wins (Seats). The regressions include
the running variable, its squared value and their interaction with the treatment dummy. Panel A shows
the coefficients from the second stage. Panel B shows the coefficients from the reduced form.The unit of
observation is a municipality. Refer to the text for more details on the sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant
at 10 percent.
in Panel A and the bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) in
Panel B. Panel C shows the results based on a bandwidth obtained by minimising the
coverage error (CER) as suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)31.
The CER approach leads to robust confidence intervals with fastest rate of coverage
error decay. Table 1.7 shows how CER-bandwidth selector provides the smallest
bandwidth and thus the largest standard errors. Across all three bandwidths, the
alignment coefficient is never significant. The results are also insignificant when
measuring the outcome in logarithms or at per capita level32.
Following both CER and MSE methods, the bandwidth choice depends on
the outcome being used and so the sample sizes are different in table 1.7. To make
the magnitudes of coefficients more comparable, I estimate for each outcome a local
31See also Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell (2018) and Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2018).
32Results available upon request.
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Table 1.6: Parametric Regressions by polynomial order





1 2 3 4 5
0 0.261 0.773 0.122 -1.133 -0.817
(0.808) (1.130) (1.478) (1.778) (2.098)
1 0.732 1.658 0.593 -1.664 -2.426
(0.818) (1.137) (1.505) (1.827) (2.170)
2 0.457 1.758 0.840 -1.206 -2.401
(0.853) (1.179) (1.546) (1.877) (2.251)
3 1.092 1.850 1.321 0.142 -1.784
(0.869) (1.204) (1.576) (1.910) (2.258)
4 0.967 1.755 1.333 0.129 -1.629
(0.855) (1.182) (1.531) (1.849) (2.184)
5 1.091 0.762 1.092 -0.476 -1.665
(0.831) (1.153) (1.497) (1.800) (2.130)




1269 617.1 334.1 232.3 168.2
Notes: the table reports the coefficients from 2SLS regressions as in equation (1.5) for
5 different degrees of polynomial. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation of the cumulated money defined in each row as up to x years after
the elections. The assignment to the treatment, DC wins (Votes), is the instrument
for DC winning the elections, DC wins (Seats). The regressions include the running
variable, its squared value and their interaction with the treatment dummy. Each
column reports the coefficient obtained from a 2SLS regression with polynomial orders,
from 1 to 5, of the running variable. The running variable is interacted with the
treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The
unit of observation is a municipality. Refer to the text for more details on the sample.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Table 1.7: Non-parametric Regression: 2SLS
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: MSE-bandwidth 1
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.279 -0.725 -0.683 0.385 0.377 0.0600
(1.586) (1.722) (1.682) (1.711) (1.629) (1.660)
Observations 410 346 364 374 390 384
BW size 0.188 0.147 0.156 0.162 0.170 0.167
Panel B: MSE-bandwidth 2 (IK)
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.186 -0.402 -0.132 0.645 0.173 -0.169
(1.472) (1.574) (1.543) (1.618) (1.807) (1.837)
Observations 448 400 410 406 332 330
BW size 0.230 0.179 0.187 0.181 0.138 0.136
Panel C: CER-bandwidth
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) -0.628 -0.250 -0.596 0.614 0.274 -0.0875
(1.827) (1.999) (1.961) (2.017) (1.935) (1.970)
Observations 328 256 278 286 298 294
BW size 0.135 0.105 0.112 0.116 0.122 0.120
Notes: the table reports estimates of the alignment effect from a local linear regression. The dependent
variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the cumulated money defined in different time periods
after the elections. The assignment to the treatment, DC wins (Votes), is the instrument for DC winning
the elections, DC wins (Seats). Each panel shows the results according to different bandwidths. Panel A
and B are based on two types of MSE-minimising bandwidth selectors. Panel C is based on a coverage
error-minimising bandwidth selector. The unit of observation is a municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant
at 10 percent.
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Table 1.8: Non-parametric Regression: 2SLS - Fixed bandwidth
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: MSE-bandwidth 1
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.276 -0.289 -0.122 0.720 0.622 0.375
(1.587) (1.540) (1.540) (1.589) (1.551) (1.565)
Observations 410 410 410 410 410 410
BW size 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188
Panel B: MSE-bandwidth 2 (IK)
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.187 -0.122 0.0810 0.809 0.764 0.459
(1.472) (1.425) (1.423) (1.466) (1.431) (1.443)
Observations 448 448 448 448 448 448
BW size 0.230 0.179 0.187 0.181 0.138 0.136
Panel C: CER-bandwidth
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) -0.627 -0.544 -0.653 0.436 0.207 -0.167
(1.827) (1.782) (1.790) (1.861) (1.828) (1.844)
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328
BW size 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135
Notes: the table reports estimates of the alignment effect from a local linear regression. The dependent
variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the cumulated money defined in different time
periods after the elections. The assignment to the treatment, DC wins (Votes), is the instrument for DC
winning the elections, DC wins (Seats). Each panel shows the results according to different bandwidths. The
bandwidths are fixed to the level of column (1) in table 1.7. Panel A and B are based on MSE-minimising
bandwidth selectors. Panel C is based on a coverage error-minimising bandwidth selector. The unit of
observation is a municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at
less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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linear regression using the bandwidth used in Column (1) of Panel A which is the
bandwidth for the money allocated in the year of the election. Table 1.8 shows the
results. The bandwidths are larger than in table 1.7 and this leads to larger and
probably more biased coefficients, especially in Panels A and B. Overall, the results
confirm that there is no evidence for a significant alignment effect.
1.5.3 Alternative outcomes
The results shown so far provide robust evidence against the existence of an overall
alignment effect on the flow of funds received by municipalities in the very first
years of CasMez. In this section, I test whether the results change by reproducing
the analysis on two alternative measures of the intensity of CasMez intervention:
number of projects per capita and average size of projects. Figures 1.7 and 1.8
respectively show the coefficients plots for the parametric regressions for quantity
and average size of projects.
For projects per capita the coefficients are mostly positive but not signifi-
cant. An exception is the effect estimated with a linear polynomial within one year
after the election. However, non-parametric estimations provide much smaller and
insignificant coefficients across all bandwidth sizes (see table 1.15 in Appendix 1.B).
The coefficient for average size of projects is also mostly positive but always in-
significant at 95%. Further analysis33 shows that the magnitude of the standardised
coefficients is similar between these two outcomes and the funds allocated and is
roughly around 0.2 for polynomials of lower degree, like quadratic or cubic. How-
ever, the coefficients are, as shown, mostly insignificant.
1.5.4 Additional robustness checks
The previous sections show that the results are stable across different specifications.
In this section I present two additional robustness checks.
First, an important caveat of this analysis is that the electoral system of
1951-52 local elections was parliamentary. This means that the elections did not
33Results available upon request.
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Figure 1.7: Projects per capita - parametric regressions. These graphs plot
the coefficients of projects per capita, measured in different time periods after the
elections, against polynomial orders of the running variable. Projects per capita
is the number of projects every 1000 inhabitants, as of 1951 population. The
coefficients come from 2SLS regressions where the assignment to the treatment is
the instrument for DC winning the elections. The running variable is interacted
with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on each side of the
cut-off. The unit of observation is a municipality.
Figure 1.8: Average size of projects - parametric regressions. These
graphs plot the coefficients of the average size of projects, measured in different
time periods after the elections, against polynomial orders of the running vari-
able. The average size of projects is the flow of funds every 100 projects. The
coefficients come from 2SLS regressions where the assignment to the treatment is
the instrument for DC winning the elections. The running variable is interacted
with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on each side of the
cut-off. The unit of observation is a municipality.
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directly determine the mayoral incumbent but only the members of the city council
only. The mayor was elected through a secret ballot by the council members. The
main concern is then that if DC had been able to influence the choice of the mayor
ex-post (despite not having the majority of seats) some municipalities might have
been aligned with the central government even when DC did not have the majority of
the seats. The null treatment effect could then be caused by treating some aligned
municipalities as unaligned ones, especially around the cut-off. To test whether
the assignment of municipalities to the treatment around the cut-off influences my
results, I replicate all the analysis as in Barreca et al. (2011) employing a donut
RDD. The idea behind this is that by systematically removing observations in the
immediate vicinity of the cut-off, I can check whether the estimate of the treatment
effect is affected by the observations around the threshold.
Figure 1.9 shows the treatment estimate from a parametric regression with
a quadratic polynomial function of the running variable by different bandwidths
dropped around the cut-off. The first coefficients in each graph are the ones shown
in table 1.5. The identification in a RDD is intrinsically related to the observations
around the cut-off so that estimates obtained when excluding them are highly biased
and misleading. In fact, the larger the number of observations dropped around the
cut-off the larger are the coefficients, especially in the first two years after the elec-
tions. Also, the coefficients gain some statistical significance once the observations
within the [-0.4;0-4] bandwidth are dropped which leads the sample size to drop
by 20%. Overall, I conclude that for reasonable bandwidths around the cut-off the
coefficients for the alignment effect is stable and never statistically significant.
Finally, as described in section 2.3, CasMez was funding, to a large extent,
multi-municipality projects. To check that results are not determined by the way I
assign multi-municipality funds to single municipalities, I replicate the analysis on
single-municipality projects only. The results34 are very similar to the ones presented
in the previous sections.
34Available upon request.
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Figure 1.9: Donut RDD These graphs plot the coefficients of parametric regres-
sions with a quadratic polynomial of the running variable against the bandwidths
within which observations have been dropped. The outcome is the inverse hy-
perbolic sine transformation of the cumulated money allocated to municipalities
defined in different time periods after the elections. The coefficients come from
2SLS regressions where the assignment to the treatment is the instrument for DC
winning the elections. The unit of observation is a municipality.
1.6 Mechanisms and discussion
The results in section 2.5 show that the allocation of CasMez investments is not
significantly affected by the political alignment of municipalities with the central
government. In this section I provide some further findings suggesting that there
is some evidence for tactical distribution, but the effect is heterogeneous and does
not to show up at the aggregate level. First, on the basis of the ideological roots of
CasMez described in section 1.2 I look at whether alignment to the main opposition
party (PCI) mattered in the allocation of funds. Second, I explore some dimensions
of heterogeneity among municipalities and test related predictions of the literature
on distributive politics.
1.6.1 Alignment with main opposition party
CasMez was part of a declared political strategy of both the US and the Italian
governments to support the development of southern regions but to curb anti-
34
governmental and especially communist sentiments(WB, 1951). Moreover, the local
elections of 1951-52 were very relevant for testing the increasing support for the com-
munist party (PCI) (Possanzini, 2000). In this context, the results of PCI rather
than of DC in these elections might have played a more direct role in the distribution
of funds. To test this, I employ an empirical setting that is identical to the one in
the main analysis, but I reframe it to identify a specific form of un-alignment, which
is alignment to the main opposition party.
In order to do this, I look at the sample of all municipalities where PCI
obtained the largest or second-largest share of votes35. The running variable is the
votes’ margin of victory (VMV) which is the difference in shares of votes between
PCI and the main opponent, and is defined as negative when PCI is the second
party. In this framework, municipalities above the cut-off are unaligned with the
central government while the ones below are aligned. As in the rest of the paper,
the probability of party control is however not exactly equal to 1 when the running
variable is equal to 0; so I use the assignment to the treatment as an instrument
for the treatment status of alignment to main opposition party. As in section 2.5,
this setup is invalid if there is manipulation of the running variable. Figures 1.25
and 1.26 in Appendix 1.B.3 show both the density distribution and the RD plots
for covariates. Both the tests proposed by (McCrary, 2008) and Cattaneo, Jansson,
and Ma (2017) cannot reject the null of no density discontinuity at the cut-off. The
RD plots suggest that municipalities where PCI just won are larger, more active in
agriculture and have more jobs per capita. These differences are not significant36,
but must be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
Figure 1.10 shows the RD plots for the main outcome, the money allocated
in the years following the election. The outcome is on average higher to the right of
the cut-off, in municipalities where PCI just won. Figure 1.11 shows the estimated
discontinuity by order of polynomial in parametric regressions. The coefficients are
strongly positive and significant for higher order polynomials when the outcome is
the money allocated up to four or five years subsequent to the election.
35For summary statistics of this sample refer to table 1.16 in Appendix 1.B.3
36Results from placebo regressions are available upon request.
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Figure 1.10: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of funds allocated
against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) of PCI by years after the
election - PCI races. These graphs show the average money allocated to
municipalities, defined in different time periods after the elections, conditional
on the difference in the share of votes between PCI and the main opponent party
or coalition. The circles represent means within 10% bins and the lines and
shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic
polynomial regression on each side of the cut-off.
These results are also confirmed by non-parametric regressions. As table 1.9
shows, the coefficients are large and positive across all three optimal bandwidths
but consistently significant only in columns (5) and (6).
In terms of magnitude, the coefficients are extremely large and definitely off
what has been found so far in the literature. However, this result is likely to be
driven by the fact that there are many zeroes in the sample, as more than half of
the municipalities did not receive any funds from CasMez within the first year from
the election. To test this, I look at whether the results are stronger on the extensive
than on the intensive margin. Figures 1.27 and 1.28 in Appendix 1.B.3 confirm this
interpretation by showing that the effect is significant 4 years after the election on
the extensive but not on the intensive margin.
These results indicate the presence of an alignment to rival party at the
end of the term for the city councils. Municipalities where PCI just won are more
likely to be targeted by CasMez than municipalities where it just lost in the year of
36
Table 1.9: Non-parametric Regression: 2SLS - PCI races
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: MSE-bandwidth 1
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCI wins (Seats) 3.669* 3.700* 3.875* 3.114 5.444*** 4.884**
(2.086) (1.920) (2.087) (2.038) (2.079) (2.057)
Observations 382 414 392 414 348 336
BW size 0.120 0.129 0.124 0.129 0.107 0.104
Panel B: MSE-bandwidth 2 (IK)
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCI wins (Seats) 3.252** 3.250** 2.043 2.322 4.883*** 3.574**
(1.535) (1.610) (1.340) (1.625) (1.791) (1.601)
Observations 622 528 720 542 452 490
BW size 0.233 0.176 0.296 0.192 0.141 0.160
Panel C: CER-bandwidth
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCI wins (Seats) 3.810 3.450 3.830 3.183 6.521** 5.591**
(2.640) (2.405) (2.676) (2.565) (2.823) (2.755)
Observations 272 292 282 290 232 224
BW size 0.0859 0.0929 0.0890 0.0925 0.0770 0.0749
Notes: the table reports estimates of the alignment to opposition effect from a local linear regression.
The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the cumulated money defined in
different time periods after the elections. The assignment to the treatment, PCI wins (Votes), is the
instrument for PCI winning the elections, PCI wins (Seats). Each panel shows the results according to
different bandwidths. Panel A and B are based on two types of MSE-minimising bandwidth selectors. Panel
C is based on a coverage error-minimising bandwidth selector. The unit of observation is a municipality.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant
at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Figure 1.11: Inverse hyperbolic sine of money allocated by years after
election - parametric regressions - PCI races. These graphs plot the co-
efficients of the money allocated, measured in different time periods after the
elections, against polynomial orders of the running variable, that is VMV for
PCI. The coefficients come from 2SLS regressions where the assignment to the
treatment is the instrument for PCI winning the elections. The running variable
is interacted with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on
each side of the cut-off. The unit of observation is a municipality.
the next local elections. A potential explanation for these findings is that DC was
attempting to swing marginal constituencies away from PCI. Other scholars have
also found that politicians use transfers for political reasons especially in election
years (for example see Brollo and Nannicini, 2012).
However, there are some limitations to these findings. First, the results are
not very stable across different polynomial orders or bandwidths. Second, as some
observables are not smooth around the cut-off, the discontinuity in funds at the cut-
off might be driven by economic, and not political, considerations. Data limitations
do not allow me to address these two points. Finally, these results are not really
comparable to the ones presented in the main analysis as the samples differ. In fact,
there are only 271 elections in which DC without coalition and PCI directly faced
each other. To make the results comparable, one possibility would be to replicate
the analysis on these DC-PCI races only. However, figure 1.29 in Appendix 1.B.3
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shows that the density distribution of the running variable in this subsample jumps
up at the cut-off. Unsurprisingly, there is evidence for manipulation in very tight
electoral races. This and also the small sample size do not allow further investigation
of the relationship between CasMez funds and alignment in a RDD setting.
1.6.2 Heterogeneity analysis
In this section I reconsider the baseline null results found in DC races by exploiting
the heterogeneity in municipality characteristics. To do so, I split the sample into
groups of municipalities above and below the median of some observables of interest.
Then, I check if the assumptions of RDD are still valid in these subsamples and, if
so, I estimate the alignment effect.
First of all, given the findings on PCI races, I test whether the baseline results
change in agricultural areas. As described in section 1.2, peasants’ strikes and lands’
invasions supported by PCI had a crucial role in pushing DC to actively intervene
on the development of the South (Crafts and Magnani, 2013). To test this, I split
the sample into rural and non-rural areas, according to the median of the share of
residents active in agriculture. Panel A of table 1.10 shows the results of the non-
parametric regressions where the outcome is again the money allocated by years
after election and the bandwidth used is the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell (2018)37. Interestingly, the coefficients are positive
in non-rural areas, below the median of agricultural activity, but negative in rural
areas. Most importantly, distinguishably from the baseline results, the coefficients
gain statistical significance within two years from the election.
As in section 1.6.1, these coefficients are very large and hard to interpret. As
Panel B shows, this is due to a large effect of alignment on the extensive margin. In
rural areas, municipalities where DC just won are 35% less likely to be targeted by
CasMez with respect to municipalities where DC just lost. In contrast, non-rural
municipalities were DC just won are 25% more likely to receive CasMez funds. All
these results are confirmed by parametric regressions38.
37Results are similar for other bandwidths and available upon request.
38Figure 1.30 in section 1.B.4 shows the coefficients plots for the parametric regressions in the
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Overall, these findings indicate that the absence of an overall alignment effect
can be explained by the co-existence of both alignment and un-alignment effects,
depending on the type of constituencies targeted. A natural way of interpreting
these results is to say that in non-rural or urban areas DC used the funds from Cas-
Mez to reward its supporters or build party strongholds, as in a partisan alignment
model. Yet, in rural areas that were at risk because of exposure to greater political
instability, DC used the funds to swing marginal municipalities away from the op-
position. These results are also in line with the findings presented in section 1.6.1
which show that municipalities aligned with PCI received on average more funds.
Another possibility is that these results are driven by other municipality
characteristics that are correlated with agricultural activity. In particular, one of
the predictions of the swing-voter model in the distributive politics literature is that
parties can increase their support by targeting voters who can be bought off with
a relative low flow of transfers. In particular, Dixit and Londregan (1996) show
how it can be more efficient for politicians to transfer resources to poorer voters.
Similarly, Grossman and Helpman (1996) consider the difference between informed
and uninformed voters and predict that uninformed voters are easier to impress and
thus cheaper to buy. These predictions applied to the context of political alignment
and no political credit spillovers suggest that unaligned rural municipalities might
get more transfers because they are cheaper to buy off (and not more politically
unstable) than unaligned non-rural municipalities.
To test this possibility, I look at whether the alignment coefficient differs be-
tween municipalities above and below the median of: number of households with no
access to water and electricity as a proxy for pre-industrial development, and illiter-
acy rate as a proxy for rate of uninformed voters. Table 1.11 shows the results from
non-parametric regressions with the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Farrell (2018)39. The signs of the coefficients are completely opposite
with respect to the pattern found for non-agricultural and agricultural areas. The
un-alignment effect comes from relatively more educated and richer areas.
two subsamples.
39Results are similar for other bandwidths and available upon request.
40
Table 1.10: Heterogeneity analysis I: rural areas
Split by % of residents active in agriculture
Panel A: Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Below median Above median
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DC wins (Seats) 0.466 2.954* 3.627** 2.979 1.879 1.070 0.215 -4.946* -4.667* -2.355 -1.533 -1.308
(2.025) (1.712) (1.824) (2.162) (2.068) (2.118) (2.296) (2.637) (2.493) (2.515) (2.430) (2.514)
Observations 244 244 226 202 204 202 202 184 198 198 202 198
BW size 0.224 0.227 0.196 0.167 0.167 0.165 0.218 0.175 0.201 0.202 0.212 0.201
Panel B: Dummy for recipients
Below median Above median
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DC wins (Seats) -0.0606 0.247* 0.276** 0.249 0.135 0.0747 0.0163 -0.343* -0.352* -0.160 -0.0934 -0.0707
(0.163) (0.135) (0.139) (0.163) (0.152) (0.156) (0.174) (0.194) (0.185) (0.184) (0.175) (0.178)
Observations 226 228 222 204 204 202 202 186 196 192 198 190
BW size 0.192 0.206 0.188 0.167 0.167 0.163 0.219 0.177 0.196 0.195 0.204 0.194
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from a local linear regression. The dependent variables are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
the cumulated money in Panel A and a dummy for receiving at least one in Panel B. Both variables are defined in different time periods after the elections. The
coefficients are reported for both outcomes from two subsamples obtained by splitting municipalities according to the median of % residents active in agriculture.
The bandwidth is the optimal MSE-minimising bandwidth.The unit of observation is a municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***
significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Table 1.11: Heterogeneity analysis II: cheaper voters
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: Illiteracy rate
Below median Above median
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DC wins (Seats) -0.284 -0.603 -1.963 -0.955 -1.516 -2.209 0.761 0.00620 1.764 2.213 2.319 2.662
(1.840) (2.180) (2.137) (2.222) (1.985) (1.990) (1.963) (2.143) (2.078) (2.033) (1.992) (2.012)
Observations 186 180 180 178 178 178 240 240 242 242 240 244
BW size 0.200 0.191 0.192 0.188 0.182 0.189 0.216 0.218 0.223 0.223 0.219 0.234
Panel B: % of households with no water/electricity
Below median Above median
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DC wins (Seats) -2.445 -2.328 -2.089 -2.328 -2.933 -2.376 1.581 0.568 1.845 3.265 3.482 1.922
(2.146) (2.665) (2.644) (2.864) (2.371) (2.700) (2.581) (2.126) (1.953) (2.025) (2.135) (2.324)
Observations 238 204 214 206 226 206 164 190 208 208 192 174
BW size 0.275 0.190 0.224 0.209 0.253 0.203 0.125 0.156 0.185 0.185 0.158 0.140
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from a local linear regression. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
the cumulated money defined in different time periods after the elections. Each panel shows the results according to different splits of municipality characteristics.
The bandwidth is the optimal MSE-minimising bandwidth.The unit of observation is a municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***
significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Most importantly, these coefficients are not significant. This evidence sup-
ports the existence of political instability rather than poverty mechanism behind the
un-alignment effect in agricultural areas40.
Overall these findings do not provide a clear-cut picture of all the politi-
cal factors behind the allocation of funds but show that the overall null effect of
political alignment masks an important heterogeneity. In particular, this analysis
indicates the co-existence of both alignment and un-alignment effects depending on
the degree of political instability of the targeted constituencies. When unaligned
marginal constituencies cannot benefit from political credit spillover of transfers and
are exposed to political instability, the central government can use the transfers to
buy their votes.
1.7 Conclusion
A large body of research in economics and political science has empirically docu-
mented a positive effect of political alignment on the distribution of central govern-
ments funds to local jurisdictions. The theoretical foundations for the direction of
this effect are crucially related to the opportunity for unaligned local governments
to claim partial or full political credit for the transfers. This work, to the best of
my knowledge, is the first to study the link between political alignment and the
transfers of an unmistakably government-branded development policy.
In particular, I investigate whether the alignment of municipalities with the
central government influenced the initial allocation of infrastructural projects by
Cassa del Mezzogiorno, a large place-based policy in post-WWII Italy. CasMez
makes a particularly insightful case study, especially because of its deep ideological
roots. It was unambiguously a policy of the ruling party (DC) and was openly
criticised by the main opposition party (PCI). This rules out the presence of political
credit spillovers. In addition, the alignment is measured on the basis of local elections
that were politically very salient and this contributes to providing an ideal context
40Table 1.17 in Appendix 1.B.4 shows also that this effect is not driven by densely populated
areas or with higher turnout.
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for testing distributive politics.
Using an RDD, I find no difference in the amount of CasMez resources re-
ceived between municipalities where DC just won and municipalities where DC just
lost. Further analysis, however, shows that this null result covers the coexistence of
both alignment and un-alignment effects. In particular, I find evidence that rural
municipalities were more likely to be targeted by CasMez if DC just lost, while
the opposite held true for non-rural or urban municipalities. These findings are
consistent with well-documented concern by DC regarding the increasing peasants’
uprisings in agricultural areas. In line with this, I also show that municipalities
where PCI just lost received more fundings than municipalities where PCI just won.
This paper makes two main contributions. It adds to the literature on the
effects of political partisanship by highlighting the importance of two crucial factors
for the relationship between alignment and the allocation of funds. The first is the
possibility of an un-alignment effect when opposition parties cannot take credit for
the transfers. In this case, the central government can use transfers to try to shift
votes away from the opposition in marginal unaligned municipalities. The second
factor is that heterogeneity in the political context of local jurisdictions may change
the direction of the allocation mechanism. In my context, the degree of political
instability may have determined the decision of the central government to target
aligned or unaligned municipalities.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on CasMez by providing
the first quantitative investigation of its allocation mechanisms. I provide evidence
that some tactical considerations played a role for the funds’ distribution during the
very first years of its activity. These findings are in line with the ideological roots
of this intervention but in contrast with the common view that the first years of




Figure 1.12: CasMez money over time, with and without multi-
municipality projects. The money in each year is measured as any
money allocated during that calendar year. Multi-municipality projects
are projects involving more than one municipality.
Figure 1.13: CasMez money over time, in the first decade of ac-
tivity, with and without multi-municipality projects. The money in
each year is measured as any money allocated during that calendar year.








Figure 1.15: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of cumulated money
against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) by years after the election -
bin size 5% These graphs show the average money allocated to municipalities,
defined in different time periods after the elections, conditional on the difference
in the share of votes between DC and the main opponent party or coalition. The
circles represent means within 5% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted
values and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression
on each side of the cut-off.
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Figure 1.16: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of cumulated money
against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) by years after the election -
bin size 15% These graphs show the average money allocated to municipalities,
defined in different time periods after the elections, conditional on the difference
in the share of votes between DC and the main opponent party or coalition. The
circles represent means within 15% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted
values and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression
on each side of the cut-off.
Figure 1.17: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of cumulated money
against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) by years after the election -
linear polynomial These graphs show the average money allocated to munic-
ipalities, defined in different time periods after the elections, conditional on the
difference in the share of votes between DC and the main opponent party or
coalition. The circles represent means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded
areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based on a linear regression
on each side of the cut-off.
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Figure 1.18: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of cumulated money
allocated against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) by years after the
election - cubic polynomial These graphs show the average money allocated to
municipalities, defined in different time periods after the elections, conditional on
the difference in the share of votes between DC and the main opponent party or
coalition. The circles represent means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded
areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based on a cubic polynomial
regression on each side of the cut-off.
Figure 1.19: Log of cumulated money allocated against votes’ margin of
victory (VMV) by years after the election - ln(1+y) These graphs show
the average log of money allocated to municipalities, defined in different time
periods after the elections, conditional on the difference in the share of votes
between DC and the main opponent party or coalition. The circles represent
means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90%
confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of
the cut-off.
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Figure 1.20: Cumulated money per capita allocated against votes’ mar-
gin of victory (VMV) by years after the election These graphs show the
average money per capita allocated to municipalities, defined in different time
periods after the elections, conditional on the difference in the share of votes
between DC and the main opponent party or coalition. The circles represent
means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90%
confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of
the cut-off.
Figure 1.21: Extensive margin. Share of municipalities that received at
least one grant against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) by year af-
ter the elections. These graphs plot a dummy for municipalities that received
at least one grant, defined in different time periods after the elections, condi-
tional on the difference in the share of votes between DC and the main opponent
party or coalition.The circles represent means within 10% bins and the lines and
shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic
polynomial regression on each side of the cut-off.
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Figure 1.22: Intensive margin. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
of funds allocated against votes’ margin of victory (VMV) by years
after the election - Recipients since year 1 only. These graphs show the
average money allocated to municipalities, defined in different time periods after
the elections, conditional on the difference in the share of votes between DC and
the main opponent party or coalition. Sample is restricted to municipalities that
received at least one grant within the first year from the elections. The circles
represent means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values
and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each
side of the cut-off.
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1.B.2 Baseline results
Table 1.12: Parametric Regressions by polynomial order
Log of money allocated by years after election
up to x years
after election
Polynomial order
1 2 3 4 5
0 0.252 0.748 0.139 -1.036 -0.741
(0.766) (1.072) (1.401) (1.685) (1.988)
1 0.691 1.568 0.553 -1.596 -2.319
(0.776) (1.079) (1.428) (1.733) (2.058)
2 0.436 1.675 0.800 -1.150 -2.280
(0.810) (1.119) (1.468) (1.782) (2.137)
3 1.037 1.759 1.244 0.117 -1.715
(0.826) (1.144) (1.498) (1.815) (2.146)
4 0.927 1.679 1.271 0.117 -1.560
(0.813) (1.124) (1.456) (1.758) (2.076)
5 1.046 0.742 1.040 -0.456 -1.600
(0.790) (1.096) (1.424) (1.713) (2.027)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794
IV F-stat 1269 617.1 334.1 232.3 168.2
Notes: the table reports the coefficients from 2SLS regressions as in equation (1.5) for 5 different degrees
of polynomial. The dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation of the cumulated money defined
in each row as up to x years after the elections. The assignment to the treatment, DC wins (Votes), is the
instrument for DC winning the elections, DC wins (Seats). The regressions include the running variable, its
squared value and their interaction with the treatment dummy. Each column reports the coefficient obtained
from a 2SLS regression with polynomial orders, from 1 to 5, of the running variable. The running variable is
interacted with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The unit
of observation is a municipality. Refer to the text for more details on the sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant
at 10 percent.
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Table 1.13: Parametric Regressions by polynomial order
Money per capita allocated by years after election
up to x years
after election
Polynomial order
1 2 3 4 5
0 15.17 65.340021* 29.79 36.01 21.86
(24.684) (39.187) (52.922) (60.798) (75.354)
1 58.98 86.44 50.47 -47.17 -81.33
(52.015) (66.894) (74.831) (81.401) (109.667)
2 61.48 126.2 108.7 -1.550 -71.34
(58.120) (77.343) (84.977) (87.933) (126.638)
3 61.78 113.3 70.03 3.846 -111.9
(69.213) (93.801) (110.269) (119.675) (153.674)
4 81.79 126.1 98.50 78.99 -42.16
(72.250) (99.316) (117.385) (127.194) (160.841)
5 86.16 104.3 56.99 66.62 -82.64
(76.195) (107.041) (128.327) (147.069) (184.209)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794
IV F-stat 1269 617.1 334.1 232.3 168.2
Notes: the table reports the coefficients from 2SLS regressions as in equation (1.5) for 5 different degrees
of polynomial. The dependent variable is the cumulated money per capita (population of 1951) defined in
each row as up to x years after the elections. The assignment to the treatment, DC wins (Votes), is the
instrument for DC winning the elections, DC wins (Seats). The regressions include the running variable, its
squared value and their interaction with the treatment dummy. Each column reports the coefficient obtained
from a 2SLS regression with polynomial orders, from 1 to 5, of the running variable. The running variable is
interacted with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The unit
of observation is a municipality. Refer to the text for more details on the sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant
at 10 percent.
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Table 1.14: Non-parametric Regression: Reduced form
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: MSE-bandwidth 1
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Votes) 0.187 -0.529 -0.566 0.292 0.176 -0.145
(1.382) (1.523) (1.549) (1.573) (1.578) (1.596)
Observations 408 332 328 342 330 328
BW size 0.183 0.139 0.135 0.142 0.136 0.135
Panel B: MSE-bandwidth 2 (IK)
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Votes) 0.160 -0.346 -0.113 0.556 0.150 -0.146
(1.266) (1.354) (1.330) (1.393) (1.563) (1.591)
Observations 448 400 410 406 332 330
BW size 0.230 0.179 0.187 0.181 0.138 0.136
Panel C: CER-bandwidth
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Votes) -0.573 -0.188 -0.501 0.673 0.600 0.136
(1.610) (1.793) (1.842) (1.891) (1.927) (1.946)
Observations 794 794 234 794 238 794
Observations 320 246 794 248 794 234
BW size 0.131 0.0993 0.0967 0.101 0.0973 0.0969
Notes: the table reports reduced form estimates of the assignment to treatment effect from a local linear
regression. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the cumulated money
defined in different time periods after the elections. Each panel shows the results according to different
bandwidths. Panel A and B are based on two types of MSE-minimising bandwidth selectors. Panel C
is based on a coverage error-minimising bandwidth selector. The unit of observation is a municipality.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant
at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Table 1.15: Non-parametric Regression: 2SLS
Projects per capita by years after election
Panel A: MSE-bandwidth 1
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.0939 -0.0301 0.0962 0.170 0.133 0.0627
(0.142) (0.0918) (0.159) (0.233) (0.311) (0.375)
Observations 380 344 390 408 400 410
BW size 0.165 0.144 0.170 0.182 0.180 0.188
Panel B: MSE-bandwidth 2 (IK)
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.141 -0.00926 0.0855 0.160 0.117 0.0447
(0.0895) (0.0885) (0.161) (0.238) (0.315) (0.381)
Observations 562 394 372 386 380 392
BW size 0.436 0.174 0.161 0.168 0.165 0.172
Panel C: CER-bandwidth
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC wins (Seats) 0.0615 0.0119 0.125 0.174 0.136 0.00708
(0.162) (0.0976) (0.169) (0.249) (0.316) (0.384)
Observations 292 250 298 318 318 328
BW size 0.118 0.103 0.122 0.130 0.129 0.135
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from a local linear regression. The dependent
variable is the number of projects every 1000 inhabitants in different time periods after the elections. Each
panel shows the results according to different bandwidths. Panel A and B are based on two types of
MSE-minimising bandwidth selectors. Panel C is based on a coverage error-minimising bandwidth selector.
The unit of observation is a municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***
significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Figure 1.23: Extensive margin - parametric regressions. These graphs plot
the coefficients of a dummy equal to 1 if the municipalities received at least one
transfer, measured in different time periods after the elections, against polyno-
mial orders of the running variable. The coefficients come from 2SLS regressions
where the assignment to the treatment is the instrument for DC winning the
elections. The running variable is interacted with the treatment dummy to allow
for different polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The unit of observation is a
municipality.
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Figure 1.24: Inverse hyperbolic sine of money allocated by years after
election - parametric regressions - intensive margin. These graphs plot
the coefficients of the money allocated, measured in different time periods after
the elections, against polynomial orders of the running variable . The sample
consists of municipalities that received CasMez money at least once within one
year from the election. The coefficients come from 2SLS regressions where the
assignment to the treatment is the instrument for DC winning the elections. The
running variable is interacted with the treatment dummy to allow for different
polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The unit of observation is a municipality.
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1.B.3 PCI races
Table 1.16: Summary statistics (PCI races)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dummy if targeted by CasMez 0.68 0.47 0 1 766
Log of money within 4 years 9.41 6.61 0 18.66 766
Number of projects every 1000 inhabitants 0 0 0 0.01 766
Average project size, thousand euros (PPP) 363.49 1370.96 0 31706.99 766
Industrial jobs per capita 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.5 766
Illiteracy rate 0.28 0.09 0.04 0.70 766
Log of population 7.83 0.66 5.7 10.18 766
Plants per capita 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.14 766
% of population active in agriculture 0.37 0.14 0.04 0.72 766
% of households with kitchens in 1951 0.95 0.07 0.45 1 766
% of households with electricity in 1951 0.65 0.23 0 0.98 766
% of households with no water/electricity 0.01 0.03 0 0.32 766
Turnout at elections 87.28 6.01 63.1 97.10 766
Votes’ share of DC (also if in coalition) 0.44 0.21 0 1 766
Votes’ share of PCI 0.41 0.13 0 0.93 766
Votes’ share of right wing coalitions 0.05 0.11 0 0.72 766
Figure 1.25: Density distribution of the running variable, VMV for PCI
This graph shows the density distribution of the running variable together with





Figure 1.26: Covariates and margin of victory of PCI. These graphs show the average of each variable
within bins of the difference in the share of votes between PCI and the main opponent party. All metrics
are based on population and industry census of 1951. The circles represent means within 10% bins and
the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial
regression on each side of the cut-off.
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Figure 1.27: Extensive margin - PCI races. Coefficients from paramet-
ric regressions. These graphs plot the coefficients of a dummy for having
received at least one grant, defined in different time periods after the elections,
against polynomial orders of the running variable, that is VMV for PCI. The
coefficients come from 2SLS regressions where the assignment to the treatment is
the instrument for PCI winning the elections. The running variable is interacted
with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials on each side of the
cut-off. The unit of observation is a municipality.
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Figure 1.28: Intensive margin - PCI races. Coefficients from parametric
regressions. These graphs plot the coefficients of the money allocated (Arc-
sinh), measured in different time periods after the elections, against polynomial
orders of the running variable, that is VMV for PCI. The sample is restricted
to the municipalities that received at least one grant within one year from the
election. The coefficients come from 2SLS regressions where the assignment to
the treatment is the instrument for PCI winning the elections. The running vari-
able is interacted with the treatment dummy to allow for different polynomials
on each side of the cut-off. The unit of observation is a municipality.
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Figure 1.29: Density distribution of the running variable - DC vs PCI
races This graph shows the density distribution of the running variable together






Figure 1.30: Parametric regressions in subsamples split by below and
above the median of agricultural activity. These graphs show the coeffi-
cients and confidence intervals from the parametric regression by different orders
of polynomials. Agricultural activity is measured as the share of resident popu-
lation active in agriculture in 1951.
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Table 1.17: Heterogeneity analysis III: population density and turnout
Arcsinh of money allocated by years after election
Panel A: Population density
Below median Above median
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DC wins (Seats) 0.873 -0.605 -1.513 -0.143 -2.196 -0.790 -0.743 -0.496 -0.0947 1.239 2.062 1.212
(2.373) (2.416) (2.568) (2.346) (2.269) (2.121) (2.170) (2.232) (2.225) (2.330) (2.238) (2.337)
Observations 176 186 162 186 168 190 210 204 210 210 206 204
BW size 0.169 0.176 0.154 0.179 0.161 0.182 0.167 0.160 0.164 0.167 0.162 0.160
Panel B: Turnout at elections
Below median Above median
Up to x years after election 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DC wins (Seats) 1.657 -1.080 -0.464 -1.159 0.726 0.605 -0.388 0.707 1.307 3.115 2.070 1.269
(2.398) (2.449) (2.122) (2.319) (2.141) (2.436) (2.317) (2.063) (2.373) (2.456) (2.451) (2.527)
Observations 176 176 186 176 184 160 188 240 200 204 198 186
BW size 0.228 0.233 0.267 0.227 0.259 0.197 0.123 0.173 0.131 0.134 0.129 0.122
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from a local linear regression. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
the cumulated money defined in different time periods after the elections. Each panel shows the results according to different splits of municipality characteristics.
The bandwidth is the optimal MSE-minimising bandwidth.The unit of observation is a municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***




“Prior to the elections of 1946, the people of southern Italy and the islands were
strong monarchists and politically showed majority in the Christian Democrat Party.
The voting in the election of 1946 on the issue of creating a republic showed a large
majority in favor of maintaining the monarchy. The left-wing parties at this time
were able to show only a small minority vote. Following the defeat on the issue
of the republic in 1946, however, and as a result of an intensive campaign by the
communist Party (based largely on promises of a distribution of land to small farmers
by breaking up large estates), a significant shift in large areas of the South and on
the islands to sympathy with the Communist Party occurred during the interval
between 1946 and 1948 elections. An aggressive campaign for land reform a other
means of’ obtaining increased employment was started which the Government could
not ignore and on which, in fact, it was required to take some action. The need for
action was, in fact, forced upon the Government as a result of forceful confiscation
of some lands in the South of Italy by members of the Communist Party following
the 1948 elections. While the development of the south is an old issue in Italy, it
is against this background that the current development program for South Italy
was authorized in an effort to counter the plans proposed by the communists and
to increase, if possible, the political prestige of the Government in these areas.”
1.C.2 Communist Party’s view
This section presents parts of the speeches given by two MPs of PCI during the
parliamentary discussions about CasMez on 18/11/1948 (Pellè, 2009).
Giorgio Amendola
“We want first of all to be against the creation of a “special agency, with its own legal
personality, called “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”. The reasons behind this are not only
related to the same reasons why many scholars, groups, associations and even some
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majority MPs are critical about the idea of subtracting such a large share of public
expenditures from the the ordinary control of the State and from effective ex-ante
and ex-post audit of the Parliament. The arguments the majority made in favour of
this have not convinced us. They say: simplification, practicality, speed [...]. They
claim that the state apparatus is “bulky” but then they create one more apparatus.
Is this special bureaucracy better than the ordinary one? We doubt it. [...] The
new Cassa should have a bureaucracy similar to the one of IRI (an Italian public
holding company making public infrastructure investments, a/n), by law under state
control but de facto prone to be controlled by few financial groups[...]. There is also
the issue of parliamentary control. We cannot take away from the Parliament the
right to precisely control the expenditures of public money, that can sum up to 100
billions per year. They tell us: you will be able to know the plans as they will be
announced at the beginning of the year. Article 1 of the draft bill mentions the design
of a general programme by the Committee of ministries; but the actual specific
programs will be prepared, coordinated and executed by the Casa per il Mezzogiorno
with its legal personality and, thus, autonomy. And these specific programmes are
the actually relevant ones, that we want to be able to know, discuss and approve
[...]. Beyond all these arguments, we have a more general and substantial criticism.
Which will be the action that Cassa will be able to take on, given the situation of
the South. It will be an agency with wide financial and executive powers, that will
be able to realise important financial operations, discount taxes, discount interest
rates, to issue bonds, to obtain loans from banks or institutions abroad, to buy
shares in private companies. All these opportunities, all these powers make Cassa a
very important centre. The most important for the southern economy. A centre of
Italian and foreigners’ financial interests, that will naturally shape Cassa’s activities.
It will become a centre of influences and corruption, out of any control, and meant
to have relevant function in southern Italy’s life, it will be a governor of southern
Italy[...]. When we look at a a public agency, like the Bank of Naples, that funds with
public money (coming from taxpayers and savers in the South) political newspapers
and local authorities, and nominates directors who are the main representatives of
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fascist journalism, through connections with monopolistic groups. such as the South
company for electricity [...] we can very well foresee what this Cassa will do
to all sectors of social, economic and political life in the South. It is a
powerful tool of electoral and political corruption that you want to put
up, for your party’s own interest, to establish the empire of your regime
in the south of Italy. ”
Mario Alicata
“First of all, CasMez is obeying to America directives[..]. The point is that you
want to create this particular instrument to make it the particular instrument of a
particular policy. It is not by chance that we have heard that CasMez will have a
big loan from the Import Export Bank, that CasMez will also benefit from private
American investments and so on. It is an instrument to penetrate the American
capital and influence into the South. And we reject this not only for the general
reasons we have always highlighted, but also- I hope that Campilli [Minister of
Finance] will confirm I am right on this!- because certain investments of American
capital in the South will not get rid of the old political and social structure of the
South, that you claim you plan to remove, but they will actually make it stronger.
This is the truth, and this is why this American inspiration behind CasMez is a
threat for the South.”
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1.C.3 Propaganda leaflets
(a) DC - The red fear : “Vote or he will be your patron”
(b) FDP - Truman’s puppets: “All united against Truman’ slaves”.
Figure 1.31: DC vs FDP - 1948 parliamentary elections
68
(a) Man 1: Great, your answer is correct. Now for 40 thou-
sands lire tell me which is the organization or political move-
ment that since the end of the was has been an obstacle to any
effort of reconstruction. Man 2: The Italian communist party.
(b) Man 1: Great, your answer is correct. Now listen carefully.
After the war for the first time in the history of our country
the problem of social and economic underdevelopment of the
South has been dealt with. For 1,250,000 lire can you tell me
who should get the merit for this great work? Man 2: the
democratic government and all its allies.
(c) Man 1: Perfect! You are very well prepared! Congratula-
tions, mr. ”small voters”. Now the last question, for 5,120,000
lire. Summing up all the answers you gave us, which party does
your conscience tell you to vote for at the next local elections?
Man 2: For the Christian Democrats? Man 3: Perfect! You
win more than 5 millions! You win freedom!









Place-based policies are interventions targeting specific areas with the aim of improv-
ing their economic performance. Their particular focus on a defined geographical
area puts them in contrast with person-based transfers of resources, such as welfare
programs. Governments in industrialised countries often resort to this class of poli-
cies, well-known examples of which include enterprise zones, the EU structural funds
and more ad-hoc infrastructural interventions, like the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) or the Appalachian Regional Commission (Neumark and Simpson, 2015).
Economists have raised concerns that these policies would generate large distortions
in economic behaviour and that any local benefit may cancel out at the aggregate
level (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008). Whether place-based policies are actually effec-
tive is then often an empirical question which a large literature has tried to answer
(see, for instance, Becker, Egger, and Von Ehrlich, 2010; Busso, Gregory, and Kline,
2013; Kline and Moretti, 2014a). Even though the findings have been inconclusive,
scholars seem to agree that a more informed policy debate requires an understanding
of the overall welfare effects of place-based policies as well as their initial economic
rationale (Kline and Moretti, 2014b; Duranton and Venables, 2018). In this paper I
stress the importance of shifting the focus from the initial and theoretical rationale
to those factors which are actually guiding the policy implementation in reality.
This argument is motivated by a large body of research which has demonstrated
the relevance of strategic or non-economic factors in the distribution of public funds
ranging from fiscal policy to foreign aid (Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa, 2006; Faye and
Niehaus, 2012). Very little is known, however, whether these insights also apply to
place-based policies.
In this paper, I study to which extent the allocation of a large place-based
policy in post-WWII Southern Italy within its target area was determined by lo-
cal labor demand shocks rather than the intended long-term development planning.
Cassa del Mezzogiorno (henceforth CasMez), was adopted by the Italian government
in 1950 to fund large infrastructural investments and improve the economic perfor-
mance of the underdeveloped southern regions. Initially designed as as a 10-year
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development plan, this intervention lasted for 40 years and included several types of
policy instruments beyond infrastructural investments, such as direct subsidies or
relocation incentives for firms. I quantify the money allocated by CasMez to each
municipality in Southern Italy and identify how local labor demand shocks affected
changes in the allocation of CasMez money. To isolate the causal effect of local
economic shocks, I combine the time variation in the industry-level growth rate of
jobs in Southern Italy with cross-sectional variation in the industry structure of the
municipalities to instrument for the jobs growth rate at municipality level. The re-
sults show that CasMez funds were allocated in a pro-cyclical way to municipalities
with faster jobs growth. This seems at odds with the original aim of CasMez to
support the industrialisation of poorer areas.
After WWII, the historical regional disparities between the North and the
South of Italy were expanding. GDP per capita of southern regions reached barely
55% of the one in Centre-North (Svimez, 2011). The Italian government, with
the strong support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) and the US government, reacted by designing a place-based development
policy, called intervento straordinario, the core of which was the institution of Cas-
Mez. CasMez was initially modelled as an independent agency, with technical skills
to design and implement large infrastructural projects for the pre-industrialization
of the most depressed areas in the South, such as land reclamation and settlement,
aqueducts, and roads. After the first seven years of activity, the intervention was
extended to also include direct subsidies to firms and incentivize industrialization.
After several institutional changes and declared lack of success, CasMez was even-
tually dissolved in 19931.
CasMez constitutes a compelling case study for studying the allocation of
a place-based policy for a variety of reasons. First, the policy was targeted at a
very large area and this creates a high degree of variation in recipients’ character-
istics. As an example, when CasMez activity started there were on average 120
non-agricultural jobs every 1000 inhabitants in municipalities in Sardinia, but only
1Precisely, it was suppressed in 1984 when a new agency, AgenSud, with very similar character-
istics was created to substitute it.
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80 in Basilicata. Second, the policy spans an extremely long period of Italian eco-
nomic history: it was created in the aftermath of a war and continued during a
period of unprecedented growth, the so-called golden age. Its activity then went on
during periods of severe international macroeconomic instability induced by 1970s’
economic shocks2. This allows for a large degree of variation in national and local
economic trends. Finally and most importantly, the socio-economic gap between
Northern and Southern Italy is still very wide today. In 2017 the unemployment
rate in the population with a degree was 11.1% in southern regions, against 6.4%
in the country as a whole and 4.2% in the Northern regions (ISTAT, 2017b)3. Four
of the southern regions are also part of the convergence area of the EU as their
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is less than 75% of the EU average (EU-
ROSTAT, 2017). Any historical evidence on CasMez can thus be informative to
current policy-makers on more or less successful features of public support to the
development of disadvantaged areas.
Even if CasMez allocated the equivalent of 140 billion euros between 1951
and 1993 to southern regions, the actual distribution of funds at the micro level
is largely unknown. To fill this gap, I use the dataset on the universe of projects
funded by CasMez, provided by the Ministry for Economic Development. I then
construct a novel municipality-level dataset, which is linked to decennial population
and industry censuses for the four decades following the introduction of CasMez
in 1950. To measure local growth rates, I use the percentage change in jobs per
capita in each municipality. Identifying the effect of local economic growth rates on
the allocation of funds is challenging because public investments can be themselves
a determinant of local growth. I tackle this issue by constructing a shift-share
instrument, in which the pre-CasMez industry structure of municipalities is used to
predict the impact of Southern Italy’s aggregate industry-level growth rate of jobs
2In numbers, GDP growth went from -10.27% in 1945 to 8,41% in 1950 to 1.61% in 1971 to go
up again in the mid-80s and collapse to 1% at the beginning of the 90s (Baffigi, 2011).
3Beyond economic development, there are severe disparities in other important aspects, such as
access to health and education services. For instance, while public nurseries in the northern regions
can offer on average 18 slots every 100 inhabitants under 2, in the South this number goes down to
4 (ISTAT, 2017a).
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per capita on the changes in CasMez funds allocation at the local level.
My baseline results show that, between 1951 and 1991, funds grew faster in
municipalities with higher decennial growth rates of jobs per capita. In terms of
magnitude, a 1 percent increase in jobs per capita growth rate is associated with
roughly 1 percent increase in the growth rate of funds. In particular, comparing OLS
and IV coefficients suggests that OLS estimation understates the true effect of de-
cennial employment growth rate on the growth of CasMez funds at the municipality
level. I argue that potential determinants of this downward bias are measurement
error or the presence of clientelistic networks. These results are robust to several
specifications such as decade fixed effects, decade-specific effects of pre-CasMez con-
trols and the inclusion of municipality linear trends as well as non-linear trends at
higher levels of aggregation.
I then exploits some dimensions of heterogeneity to shed further light on the
mechanisms behind the baseline results. First, I look at cross-sectional differences
in pre-CasMez levels of development and find that the response of CasMez funds to
job growth was larger in municipalities with higher initial levels of both industrial
and social development. More precisely, the results are predominantly driven by
municipalities in the top quintile of the distribution of pre-CasMez jobs per capita.
Secondly, I replicate the main analysis by using different measures of the interven-
tion. I find that the growth in the flow of money is coming from CasMez funding
larger rather than more projects to growing municipalities. I also find that the
results are very similar when outcomes are measured as levels and not as growth
rates.
Overall, these results suggest that the allocation of CasMez was influenced
by local business cycles. In particular, the largest investments were targeted at ar-
eas that were growing faster and had better growth prospects. These findings seem
at odds with the official intentions of CasMez to create the basis for self-sustained
growth in less developed areas (Podbielski, 1978) and suggest that other allocation
criteria might also have been at work. One interpretation is that, as this policy
lost very early its temporary nature, it might have become more ordinary by re-
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sponding to economic shocks over time. Also, vote-maximising behaviour might
have incentivised policy makers to divert larger and riskier investments towards
more promising areas to increase support for the central government. This view
can also be interpreted consistently with political agency models that predict pro-
cyclical fiscal policies in developing countries where voters do not trust governments
(Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008). Beyond these motives, the findings can
be consistent with other rationales for place-based policies highlighted in the lit-
erature. First, subsidizing unproductive places is an imperfect way of transferring
resources to more depressed areas because of mobility responses (Kline and Moretti,
2014b). Secondly, spatially concentrated funding can be used to exploit agglom-
eration economies. Also, these results could point to a demand-based allocation
mechanism, if growing areas were also more likely to ask for funds, especially for
direct industrial subsidies (Felice and Lepore, 2017).
This paper is linked to various strands of the economics literature. First,
I add to the existing line of empirical research on place-based policies4. Within
this area, my work is closest to Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich (2012) for their
focus on the distribution of funds. The authors find that transfers of EU regional
policy generate faster growth in recipient regions but argue that overall a different
distribution of funds would have led to higher aggregate efficiency and growth.
My analysis also speaks to the large body of research on additional motives
of public transfers. On the one hand, this paper is connected to the literature on the
strategic determinants of government’s transfers within countries, as in Burgess et al.
(2015), Bracco et al. (2015) or Carozzi and Repetto (2016). On the other hand, the
nature of CasMez as a development agency puts this work close to studies on the
determinants of development aid that analyse the impact of strategic or political
factors unrelated to the need of recipient countries (see Faye and Niehaus, 2012;
Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007). There are, however,
fewer studies focussing on how aid is subsequently distributed within the recipient
country, as noted by Qian (2015). One of the few exceptions is Jayne et al. (2002),
4See Neumark and Simpson (2015) for a comprehensive review.
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who find evidence for spatial rigidity of food aid allocations in Ethiopia and explain
it with inertia in the allocation mechanisms. My work builds on both literatures
but shifts the attention to the role of local economic cycles.
Finally, this paper relates to a growing literature in economic history on Cas-
Mez. Most of this research focuses on qualitative or aggregate appraisals of CasMez
intervention and finds that, while CasMez contributed to the convergence of south-
ern regions in the 1950s, institutional changes and corruption were responsible for
the later ineffectiveness of the policy, especially after the mid-1960s (see in particular
Felice and Lepore, 2017; Papagni et al., 2018). All these works are contributing to
improve the knowledge about the evolution of CasMez over the years of its activity.
However, the unit of analysis is usually the region; while this can give important
insights on macro trends, it does not furnish a valid base for rigorous economet-
ric evaluations. To my knowledge, this work provides the very first comprehensive
quantitative analysis of the economic criteria guiding the allocation of CasMez at
the micro-level for over 40 years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the eco-
nomic conditions of Italian southern regions after WWII and the birth and devel-
opment of Cassa del Mezzogiorno. Section 2.3 describes the data sources as well as
the construction of the variables of interest. Section 2.4 presents the methodology
and discusses the identification strategy. Section 2.5 describes the results from the
baseline specification and the heterogeneity analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background: the southern question and CasMez
WWII had a devastating impact on the Italian economy Italy with GDP in 1945
being at the same level as of 1906 (Toniolo, 2013). Damages to infrastructures from
both Nazi Germany’s occupation and Allies’ bombing have been estimated to reach
at about 52 million dollars (Pellè, 2009). Universal access to basic amenities was not
guaranteed and half of the population was undernourished during the years 1946-47
(Vecchi, 2011). However, similar to many other Western European countries, Italy
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soon entered a period of high economic growth, the so-called golden age. GDP per
capita increased by 85% from 1945 and 1949 alone (Felice, 2015). The literature
generally agrees in defining the post-war settlement and the European Recovery
Program as key ingredients for this rapid growth. Recently, Giorcelli (2016) has
shown that, thanks to US grants, the industrial production in Italy increased by 20
percent and reached the pre-war level by 1950 already.
However, the historical North-South divide did not improve after the war5.
Even if not all scholars agree on the timing and determinants of the persisting re-
gional differences in Italy, commonly referred to as the southern question, it is widely
accepted that both world wars sharply increased the economic gap between North
and Southern Italy (Felice and Lepore, 2017). By the end of the 1940s, northern
regions were experiencing high growth rates while the South was still facing very
low level of industrialisation with 34% of GDP coming from agriculture compared
to 19% in the Centre-North (Podbielski, 1978). This was accompanied by stark
differences in living conditions: while 58.9% of inhabitants in the South had no or
very low consumption of meat, sugar and wine, this was only 6.9 % in northern
regions (Vecchi, 2011).
This situation as well as strategic political considerations6 were the driving
factors that pushed the Christian-Democrat government, which was strongly sup-
ported by the US government and the IBRD, to launch an economic intervention
called intervento straordinario, at whose core was the creation of Cassa del Mezzo-
giorno. CasMez was a state-owned agency, initially designed to last for 10 years in
order to plan and implement basic infrastructural projects in the deprived areas of
the South. Identifying a common rationale of CasMez intervention over the entire
40 years is challenging, especially because the initial mandate was extended and
modified multiple times. Scholars have generally agreed that the history of CasMez
can be divided into four main phases (Felice and Lepore, 2017):
5Eckaus (1961) estimated a 15 to 25 percent differential in income per capita between the North
and the South already in 1861, the year of Italy’s unification.
6Southern regions expressed a clear preference for monarchy during the 1946 referendum, after
which Italy became a Republic. Moreover, peasants were strongly opposing the central government
through widespread occupations of lands (Barucci, 1978).
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• 1950-1957: pre-industrialization. The very first plan of CasMez included
projects to provide deprived areas with basic infrastructures and create a
big-push towards self-sustained growth. Projects were mainly related to recla-
mation, transformation and settlement of lands, aqueducts and severs, roads
and, to a smaller extent, tourism.
• 1958-1970: industrialization. CasMez was significantly refunded and started
to directly subsidise industries and target clusters to stimulate the emergence
of agglomeration economies with the explicit goal of creating more jobs.
• 1970-1984: regions. The implementation of the policy changed drastically as
the newly born regions entered the decisional and planning process. Increas-
ingly ad-hoc measures were taken and room for tactical distribution increased.
• 1985-1993: phase-out. CasMez is suspended in 1984 and a new agency, Agen-
Sud, is created acknowledging that the intended results had not been achieved.
AgenSud was substantially different from CasMez and can be seen more like a
formal institution to gradually phase-out State’s direct intervention in south-
ern regions.
In terms of operative structure, CasMez was designed to mimic the experi-
ence of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). In practice, however, it was quite
different from its prototype. The TVA had full powers to solve one uniform tech-
nical issue, without having to report to central structures (Svimez, 2015). CasMez
instead was only responsible for the technical planning of the projects and the su-
pervision of their implementation. The detailed administration and execution of
the projects was in the hands of appointed existing agencies, usually provincial or
regional departments. Moreover, while the general technical planning was carried
out by CasMez, it had to meet the development strategies which were designed at
parliamentary or government level. The lack of clear government directives and the
need to make fast decisions were often calling for more standardised and less sophis-
ticated planning and intervention. CasMez’s own director (Pescatore, 1961) noticed
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already in the 1960s that the government committee responsible for determining the
general scope of the policies often ended up formulating policies on an ad hoc basis.
Evaluating the overall welfare effects of 40-years of CasMez on southern re-
gions’ is extremely challenging. Scholars, however, tend to agree that the first 15
years of activity were strongly correlated with the very first and last episode of con-
vergence by southern regions towards those in the North (Daniele and Malanima,
2007; Felice and Lepore, 2017). In the first two decades of CasMez activity, the
South’s GDP per capita rose at an average annual rate of 5.77 percent (Iuzzolino,
Pellegrini, and Viesti, 2013). Yet, scholars also agree that some institutional and
economic changes have contributed to the decrease in the ability of CasMez to stim-
ulate the economy of southern regions (d’Adda and de Blasio, 2017). Sociologists
have highlighted that two crucial unintended consequences of this large state inter-
vention were corruption and the creation of a deep economic dependency of southern
regions on state aid (Trigilia, 1992). Some scholars have even argued that CasMez
might have contributed to the increasing divergence within the South itself (Chubb,
1982).
2.3 Data
The quantitative analysis of this paper is based on three main data sources: a
project-level dataset on CasMez and Industry and Population Censuses that cover
the 1951-1991 period. The CasMez project-level dataset was provided by the Min-
istry of Economic Development and includes information on timing, location, size
and type of the universe of projects funded by CasMez. In order to merge this infor-
mation with the two types of census data, I created the very first municipality-level
dataset for CasMez, by allocating projects to time comparable units of observation
and taking into account all border changes which occurred between 1951 and today.
While almost 90% of the projects can be matched to a single municipality in the
Ministry’s database, 48% of the total funds are coded as being targeted to public
works projects referred to as pluricomunali, i.e. multi-municipality. For those multi-
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Figure 2.1: CasMez funds
municipality projects that are recorded without a list of targeted locations, I have
extracted location names and other geographical references from the project title7.
For each municipality, I can thus reconstruct the number of projects and the corre-
sponding flow of money received over a decade. All monetary values are converted
to their 2011 value, through the conversion coefficients for historical comparisons
provided by the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT).
The data from the decennial industry and population censuses from 1951 to
1991 have been obtained from different electronic and paper sources8. From these
datasets I create the main independent variable as well as a large set of municipality-
level controls. The population census provides not only the count of residents but
also other demographics, such as age, literacy level, household conditions and res-
idents active in agriculture. The industry census has a wide coverage of economic
7More details on how I implement this process, how I track border changes and on the data
cleaning process in general can be found in appendix 2.A
8I have digitized the population census for 1951 and 1961. The other waves from the population
census have been extracted by Atlante Statistico dei Comuni, available for download from ISTAT
website. The industry census data is also available in electronic format on ISTAT website. The
comparison between the different waves of the industry census can be done thanks to the recon-
structed time series provided by ISTAT, that take into account all the differences in data collection
that occurred over the years. For this reason, I do not use data before 1951. Moreover, because
of the war, no census was carried out in 1941. For more details and all definitions used see Istat
(1998).
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activity and provides the number of employees in each plant by sector in each mu-
nicipality. I use 3-digit sectors to allow for meaningful comparisons, as for some
economic activities a higher level of disaggregation was introduced in 1961 only.
Appendix 2.B reports the list of industries of the final dataset. To allow compar-
isons from 1951, the following industries are not included in the analysis: fishing,
legal services, informatics, R&D, public administration, education and health ser-
vices.
In order to measure local labor demand shocks, I look at the percentage
change of employment rate (ER). However, since municipality-level data on employ-
ment rates were collected by the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT) only from 1977
onwards, I proxy ER with the number of jobs per capita, henceforth JPC. JPC is
constructed by dividing the number of employees by the resident population older
than 10 years9. The main difference between JPC and ER is that the former metric
approximates the number of jobs in a given location while the latter measures the
number of residents with jobs. This implies that the metric I use has three main
limitations:
1. For JPC the statistical unit is a plant or activity, while for ER it is a person.
JPC cannot easily detect people that work from home as well as free lance or
independent workers.
2. JPC is measured at the location where the activity takes place while ER is
measured where the person lives. Especially at the municipality level, the
difference between JPC and ER can be large if workers are mobile.
3. JPC does not take into account participation in the labor force.
In general, JPC is likely to underestimate the level of employment rate. Yet, it
might also overestimate it whenever there is a very large inflow of commuters in
the municipality. In terms of growth rates, however, the difference between the two
9Employees are defined as any employees, dependent or independent, full or part-time, with
permanent or temporary contracts.
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metrics will depend on many factors10. Finally, a disadvantage of JPC is that, as
it is derived from the industry census, it does not cover the entire economy and, in
particular, it does not cover agriculture. In order to take trends in the agricultural
sector into account, I include the proportion of residents active in agriculture as a
control in all regressions. As this variable is derived from the population census it
cannot be simply added to the count of jobs when creating JPC.
There are also some advantages of using JPC over ER. First, it provides a
more uniform economic classification as it is based on the economic activity declared
by the plant owner while ER is based on individual declarations. Secondly, JPC is
based on a spatial statistical unit defined in terms of economic activity which may
actually serve a better proxy for the target of a place-based policy. In the industry
censuses these local units are defined as unità locali and are all the plants or groups
of plants where the firm materially carries out its activities to produce goods or
services.
These three data sources have been linked together to create a panel of 2,810
municipalities over 4 decades and 5 points in time. Figure 2.2 shows the area studied
in the analysis. The data covers all the southern regions and Lazio where half of
the municipalities were targeted by CasMez11. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics
for the main variables used in the analysis. As expected, JPC growth and the
distribution of funds exhibit very large variation over four decades.










which is then equal to
GrowthRate(#ofemployedid) −GrowthRate(pop15−64id )
Assuming that the working age population is growing at the same rate as the population over 10, the
GrowthRate(JPCid) will be overestimating GrowthRate(ERid) whenever jobs in a municipality
are growing at a faster rate than people with jobs.
11Marche, Toscana and Umbria are excluded from the dataset because only a very small area was
targeted by CasMez. In each region less than 4% of all the municipalities received money at least
once. Results are also robust if Lazio is excluded from the sample.
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Figure 2.2: CasMez: target area
Provinces targeted by CasMez and included in the sam-
ple are highlighted in grey.
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Table 2.1: Descriptives
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Funds-million euros 10.9 58.58 0 2697.72 14050
Funds per capita-euros 1982.58 8986.46 0 578250.75 14050
10-year growth of funds 0.36 1.39 -6.33 5.87 11240
# of projects 12.59 34.57 0 1187 14050
Average funds per project-million euros 0.55 2.43 0 161.95 14050
Jobs p.c. (JPC) 0.1 0.08 0.01 3.12 14050
JPC growth 0.24 0.66 -0.91 19.47 11240
Plants p.c. (PPC) 0.05 0.01 0 0.23 14050
Area in sq km 49.91 67.05 0.12 1501.25 14050
Dummy for coastal municipality 0.16 0.37 0 1 14050
Illiteracy rate 1951 0.27 0.09 0.03 0.70 14050
% of households without water in 1951 0.47 0.31 0 2.35 14050
Log of population in 1951 7.99 0.94 5.38 14.15 14050
% of population active in agriculture in 1951 0.37 0.14 0.02 0.84 14050
Population density in 1951 167.73 352.56 6.95 8084.58 14050
Notes: the sample is made of 2,810 municipalities observed at 5 points in time, over four decades.
It shrinks to 4 points in time when computing growth rates. For per capita measures and shares,
the denominator is the population older than 10.
2.4 Methodology
To investigate the relationship between the allocation of CasMez funds and local
economic growth, I estimate the coefficient β in the following equation:
∆fundsid = β∆jpcid + (Xi0 ∗ ηd)δ + ηd + ψi + εid (2.1)
where variables in lower case indicate logarithmic transformations of upper case
level variables so that ∆fundsid represents the growth rate of CasMez funds in
municipality i between decade d-1 and d and ∆jpcid denotes the growth rate of
the level of jobs per capita JPC. Decade fixed effects, ηd, are included to absorb
the impact of aggregate economic shocks. I also include a vector of interactions
between pre-intervention covariates, Xi0, and decade fixed effects which controls for
the time-varying impact of initial conditions on both JPC and funds growth rates.
Xi0 comprises of geographical factors (altitude, dummy for coastal locations and
log of the municipality area in square kilometres) as well as socio-economic deter-
minants (population density, log of population, percentage of population active in
agriculture, illiteracy rate and percentage of households with no access to water). ψi
are municipality fixed effects controlling for trends in the outcome and independent
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variable. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the municipality
levels, but results are robust to clustering at province and commuting zones level
too.
This specification may still not account for several sources of unobserved
heterogeneity which could lead to a bias in the OLS estimate of β, the direction
of which is ambiguous ex-ante. Two major concerns are simultaneity and reverse
causality. Local economic growth is presumably determined by the changes in Cas-
Mez funds over time and the estimation of (2.1) cannot isolate this contemporaneous
effect from the response of CasMez to local shocks. More generally, any constant
and time-varying unobservables could co-determine local economic growth and Cas-
Mez allocation. One example of this would be the presence of clientelistic networks.
These may cluster in thriving areas where they are able to capture more of the pol-
icy’s funds and are also more likely to influence the economic development. Finally,
there can be some error in the measurement of ∆jpcid
12 which if correlated with
the error term maylead to attenuation bias.
For all these reasons, I employ an instrumental-variables (IV) strategy to
account for the potential endogeneity in the growth rate of JPC. Following Bartik
(1991), I predict the growth rate of JPC with a weighted average of the aggregate
industry-level growth rates observed in the South13. The idea of this instrument is
to combine the exogenous time variation deriving from the aggregate industry-level
growth rate with the pre-determined cross-sectional variation deriving from ini-
tial industry-shares which determines the degree of exposure to the time variation.
∆jpcid is then proxied by the growth rate one would observe had each municipal-
ity grown at the economy-wide growth rate and had the industry composition not
changed. The used weights are the shares of JPC in each 3-digit industry in a given
municipality at the beginning of the sample period in 1951.
12See section 2.3
13Commonly, scholars use the national growth rate. However, this does not seem appropriate
in this context as the economic structure of the North was significantly different, as mentioned in
section 2.2.
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In the baseline specification, I estimate the first stage as follows:
∆jpcid = γBid + (Xi0 ∗ ηd)δ̃ + η̃d + ψ̃i + ε̃id (2.2)
where Bid is the instrument and is equal to
∑
swis0 ∗ ∆jpcSouthsd ). The weights for
each municipality i and sector s, wis0, are defined as
JPCis0
JPCi0
. As in equation (2.1),
η̃d are decade fixed effects, Xi0 ∗ ηd are the interactions between them and a vector
of controls measured at the beginning of the sample period and ψi are municipality
fixed effects.
By using the predicted values of ∆jpcid equation (2.1) can then be estimated
via 2SLS as :
∆fundsid = β∆̂jpcid + (Xi0 ∗ ηd)δ + ψi + ηd + εid (2.3)
where ∆̂jpcid is the predicted growth rate of number of jobs per capita in each
municipality.
The identification of β in equation (2.3) relies on the interaction between
the weights and the economy-wide industry trends to be exogenous conditional on
observables. Arguably, the weights that measure the industrial structure are prede-
termined and this can rule out the simultaneity channel of endogeneity. However,
the initial industrial structure of a municipality could still be determining the al-
location of CasMez, through other channels that are not directly related to JPC
growth rate. The controls I use are in fact crucial as any aspect of economic devel-
opment might be an important omitted variable. Most importantly, less industrially
developed municipalities are also more likely to be predominantly based on agricul-
tural production and, as the aim of CasMez was initially to industrialise rural areas,
this would constitute a channel through which the instrument may directly affect
the allocation of CasMez. This makes it particularly important to control for the
share of residents active in agriculture. In addition to this, I also present regressions
weighted by population in 1951.
Another way to shut down the impact of unobservable shocks is to allow for
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non-linear trends at slightly higher levels of aggregation such as provinces and labor
market area. or commuting zones (CZ). The sample contains 46 provinces which are
administrative clusters of municipalities. Up to the introduction of regions in 1970
they were the only administrative body above the municipality. Commuting zones
are constructed by ISTAT and defined as sub-regional geographical areas where the
bulk of the labor force lives and works. Boundaries were defined in 198114 for the
first time on the basis of commuters who cross the boundary on the way to work.
Overall my sample contains 353 commuting zones.
As the distribution of CasMez funds is very skewed to the right and 25%
of the observations are zeroes, the growth rate of the outcome variable is proxied
by the first difference of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the funds15.
As suggested in Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988), this transformation can be
preferred to a logarithmic one as it reduces the influence of extreme values while
being defined for zero values of the outcome variable16. Results are robust to a more
standard log(1 + y) transformation too.
2.5 The effect of jobs growth on CasMez allocation
2.5.1 Baseline results
This section highlights and discusses the baseline results. Table 2.2 shows the es-
timated γ of the first stage equation, equation (2.2), across different specifications.
As expected, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the baseline
specification. The coefficient is also robust to the inclusion of controls, alone and
interacted with time fixed effects, even if it drops in size. This confirms how crucial
initial conditions of municipalities and their time-varying effects are as they are also
correlated with the instrument. Finally, weighting of observations with population
in 1951 pushes the coefficient up a bit which suggests that the growth rate of larger
14The boundaries are clearly endogenous as they were determined on the basis of industrial
structures probably affected by CasMez and for this reason the labor market areas have not been
used as unit of observation.
15This is log(y + (y2 + 1)(1/2)).
16Except for very small values, the inverse sine is approximately equal to log(2y).
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municipalities is better predicted by aggregate industry growth rates. Overall, these
results rule out any kind of weak instruments concern.
Table 2.3 compares the estimates of β coefficients in the OLS and 2SLS
specifications (equation (2.1) and (2.3), respectively). The odd columns report OLS
coefficients while the even columns the 2SLS ones. OLS estimates are positive and
significant and point to a strong correlation between the percentage changes in Cas-
Mez funds and JPC growth even after controlling for constant and time-varying
effects of socio-economic development and geographical characteristics, alone or in-
teracted with decade dummies. The IV estimates are also positive and significant
but consistently larger than the OLS ones. The difference becomes smaller once
the interactions of controls with time fixed effects are included. The IV coefficient
drops in column 2 which indicates that the controls are capturing at least some of
the variation in the changes of CasMez allocation. The relative size of municipalities
is influencing the coefficient as it goes up in column 8. Based on this specification,
one percentage increase in the growth rate of JPC is associated with a 1.2 percentage
increase in the growth rate of CasMez funds. The coefficient is also robust to unit
linear trends through the inclusion of municipality fixed effects as well as non-linear
trends using interactions of region, province and commuting zone fixed dummies
with decade fixed effects (see table 2.9 in the appendix). This is particularly in-
sightful as it allows to ruling out that the detected effect is coming from trends in
groups of municipalities or specific areas.
As mentioned in section 2.4, there are several factors that could bias the OLS
estimation of β. To the extent that the instrument is valid, the results show that the
OLS estimates are downward biased. One reason could be attenuation bias arising
from measurement error as described in section 2.4. Another reason could be for
instance the presence of clientelistic networks that would attract CasMez funds but
hinder local economic growth.
On the other hand, IV approach measures a local average treatment effect
(LATE) on compliers. Therefore, the IV coefficient could be larger than the OLS
one because it is capturing the effect coming from growing areas that are more rep-
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Table 2.2: First stage
JPC growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆jpc ∆jpc ∆jpc ∆jpc ∆jpc
Bartik IV 0.944*** 0.642*** 0.659*** 0.572*** 0.699***
(0.071) (0.083) (0.086) (0.091) (0.111)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls NO NO NO YES YES
Population weights NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240
R-squared 0.0150 0.0203 0.0260 0.0360 0.115
Municipalities 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
IV F-stat 175.3 59.12 58.25 39.59 39.49
Notes: The table reports the estimate of γ in 2.2. The instrument is the weighted average of growth of
jobs per capita in 3-digits in the whole South. The controls included are measured at the beginning of the
sample period and are: share of resident population that is illiterate, share of households with no access
to water, log of resident population, log of municipality area in squared km, population density, share of
resident population active in agriculture, average altitude in metres, a dummy for coastal areas. The units
of observation are municipalities in 5 points in time. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: Baseline results: the effect of ∆jpc
Outcome variable: growth rate of CasMez funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆jpc 0.234*** 0.860*** 0.229*** 0.588*** 0.400*** 0.950*** 0.387*** 1.179*
(0.028) (0.208) (0.027) (0.218) (0.046) (0.292) (0.062) (0.629)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Population weights NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Municipality trends NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240
R-squared 0.356 0.271 0.394 0.366 0.541 0.520 0.585 0.497
Municipalities 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
IV F-stat 58.25 39.59 39.49 21.41
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions. Odd columns report coefficients from OLS
regression; even columns report coefficients from 2SLS regressions. For 2SLS regressions the instrument
is the weighted average of growth of jobs per capita 3-digits sectors in the whole South. Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic is reported from the first stage. The controls included are measured at the beginning of the
sample period and are: share of resident population that is illiterate, share of households with no access
to water, log of resident population, log of municipality area in squared km, population density, share of
resident population active in agriculture, average altitude in metres, a dummy for coastal areas. The units
of observation are municipalities in 5 points in time. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Reduced form
Outcome variable: growth rate of CasMez funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆funds ∆funds ∆funds ∆funds ∆funds
Bartik IV for JPC 0.592*** 0.566*** 0.337*** 0.664*** 0.852
(0.139) (0.133) (0.124) (0.222) (0.592)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Population weights NO NO NO YES YES
Municipality trends NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240
R-squared 0.326 0.345 0.383 0.530 0.577
Municipalities 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome variable on the instrument. The
instrument is the weighted average of growth of JPC in 3-digits sectors in the whole South. The controls
included are measured at the beginning of the sample period and are: share of resident population that
is illiterate, share of households with no access to water, log of resident population, log of municipality
area in squared km, population density, share of resident population active in agriculture, average altitude
in metres, a dummy for coastal areas. The units of observation are municipalities in 5 points in time.
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
resentative of the economy-wide trends and are probably also more likely to attract
CasMez investments. Table 2.4 reports the results from the reduced form which
show that the interaction between predetermined industry structure and economy-
wide growth of JPC affects the allocation of CasMez money. As for the first stage,
the results are quite stable across different specification.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity analysis
Overall, the results presented in section 2.5.1 provide evidence that over the whole
period of its activity CasMez has been targeting more areas with higher rates of job
creation. There could be multiple rationales for this. For example, policy-makers
might want to target to areas with higher returns and better growth prospects
for efficiency reasons. Or they might want to tactically distribute funds in order
to improve government’s reputation. Or they might just base allocation on the
demand for funds. This section examines whether the baseline effect identified in
the previous section varies across both municipality and investment characteristic
to gain further insights on the mechanisms behind the main results.
First, place-based development policies, like CasMez, predominantly aim to
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sustain poorer areas. Standard models with perfect market clearing would, however,
suggest that creating incentives to work and live in poorer areas is inefficient (Glaeser
and Gottlieb, 2008). This notwithstanding, the welfare effects of these place-based
policies can be quite large in the presence of labor market frictions and high levels
of unemployment (Kline and Moretti, 2013; Austin, Glaeser, and Summers, 2018).
Bearing these two points in mind, the question is whether CasMez was targeted at
fast-growing areas which were initially deprived or those with higher growth poten-
tial from the very outset. To test this, I split municipalities into different subsamples
according to the median of three pre-CasMez measures of under-development. In
particular, I use illiterate rate, share of population active in agriculture and share
of households with no access to water.
Table 2.5 compares the baseline results shown in table 2.3 with the results
obtained by estimating 2.3 on different subsamples of municipalities according to
median splits mentioned above. The results show that the coefficient is positive
and large only in municipalities with below median values of underdevelopment
regardless of the meausure used to proxy for it. Most importantly, standard errors
also do not increase a lot indicating that the statistical significance behind the
baseline results is also driven by precisely these areas. CasMez funds were thus
increasingly targeted not only at areas which were growing faster, but particularly
at those with lower initial levels of underdevelopment. These results are partially
confirmed by splitting municipalities according to the 1951 value of JPC and plants
per capita (PPC).
Table 2.6 shows that the IV coefficients are positive in each group of munici-
palities, but only significant for those with initial higher values of JPC or with initial
lower values of PPC. While the former result is easily reconcilable with the findings
presented in table 2.5, the latter is less easy to interpret. In general, however, PPC
is a problematic measure of development as it also a measures spatial dispersion of
enterprises.
To further understand how the effect varies along the distribution of initial
levels of under-development of the municipalities, I also split the sample according
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity I: pre-CasMez underdevelopment
Outcome variable: growth rate of CasMez funds
All Illiterate %of pop active % households
rate in agriculture w/o water
above/below median below above below above below above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆jpc 0.950*** 1.478*** -0.033 1.066*** 0.036 1.055*** -0.507
(0.292) (0.394) (0.480) (0.329) (0.492) (0.326) (0.739)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Population weights YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11240 5620 5620 5620 5620 5620 5620
R-squared 0.520 0.570 0.459 0.566 0.363 0.552 0.339
Clusters 2810 1405 1405 1405 1405 1405 1405
Notes: The table reports coefficients from IV regressions. The first column reports the baseline results as in
table 2.3. Columns 2-7 report the coefficient from the same regressions on subsamples split by the median
of three measures of underdevelopment: share of illiterates, share of population active in agriculture and
share of households with no access to water. The instrument is the weighted average of growth of jobs
per capita in 3-digits sectors in the whole South. The controls included are measured at the beginning
of the sample period and are: share of resident population that is illiterate, share of households with no
access to water, log of resident population, log of municipality area in squared km, population density,
share of resident population active in agriculture, average altitude in metres, a dummy for coastal areas.
The units of observation are municipalities in 5 points in time. Standard errors clustered at municipality
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Heterogeneity II: pre-CasMez industrial conditions
Outcome variable: growth rate of CasMez funds
All JPC 1951 PPC 1951
above/below median below above below above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆jpc 0.950*** 0.410 1.216*** 0.799*** 1.017
(0.292) (0.451) (0.358) (0.290) (0.696)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Population weights YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11240 5620 5620 5620 5620
R-squared 0.520 0.440 0.562 0.588 0.453
Clusters 2810 1405 1405 1405 1405
Notes: The table reports coefficients from IV regressions. The first column reports the baseline results as in
table 2.3. Columns 2-5 report the coefficient from the same regressions on subsamples split by the median
of jobs per capita (JPC) and plants per capita (PPC). All other notes of table 2.5 apply. Standard errors
clustered at municipality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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to quintiles of JPC in 1951. Strikingly, table 2.10 in appendix 2.B shows that the
significant and strong correlation between growth rates of CasMez funds and JPC
exists only in the top quintile of initial local conditions. This suggest that the
baseline results are entirely driven by places which were already much better off
when CasMez started its funding activity.
The final dimension of heterogeneity I investigate is the way of measuring
CasMez intervention. The baseline results show that the flow of money grows more
in areas that are growing faster but are not informative about the way this flow is
generated. As the allocation of CasMez funds was plausibly happening at a higher
frequency than decades, the growth in the flow of money could derive from two sce-
narios: i) CasMez was funding larger investments in better performing municipalities
or ii) CasMez was funding more investments in better performing municipalities. To
disentangle between these two scenarios, I replicate the analysis presented in section
2.5.1 with different outcome variables. One is the inverse hyperbolic sine transfor-
mation of the total amount of projects per capita (count) and the other one is the
ratio between the flow of money and the count (size)17 .
Table 2.7 compares the baseline results as in table 2.3 to the results obtained
by using the growth rate of count and size instead of funds. In line with scenario i),
JPC growth seems to be uncorrelated with the changes in the number of projects
but significantly and positively correlated with the growth in the average size of
projects. Table 2.8 reproduces the same analysis, but with the outcomes measured
as levels and not as growth rates. Again, while higher JPC growth rate is associated
with higher number and larger average size of the projects, the number of projects
is unaffected. Overall, these results suggest that CasMez targeted municipalities
which were expanding more, by providing more funds per project rather than more
projects.
17Results are robust to logarithmic transformations.
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneity III: growth of amount, count and average size of projects
Funds growth Count growth Size growth
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆jpc 0.400*** 0.950*** 0.186*** 0.004 0.132*** 0.302*
(0.046) (0.292) (0.023) (0.219) (0.029) (0.167)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Population weights YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240
R-squared 0.541 0.520 0.692 0.689 0.240 0.229
Municipalities 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
IV F-stat 39.49 39.49 39.49
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS and IV regressions. Odd columns show OLS estimates
while even columns show IV ones. The first two columns reports the baseline results as in table 2.3.
Columns 3-6 reports the coefficient from the same regressions with the outcomes being the growth rate in
the number of projects in columns 3 and 4, and the growth rate in the average project size in column 5
and 6 . The instrument is the weighted average of growth of jobs per capita in 3-digits sectors in the whole
South. The controls included are measured at the beginning of the sample period and are: share of resident
population that is illiterate, share of households with no access to water, log of resident population, log
of municipality area in squared km, population density, share of resident population active in agriculture,
average altitude in metres, a dummy for coastal areas. The units of observation are municipalities in 5
points in time. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 2.8: Heterogeneous results IV: levels of amount, count and average size of
projects
Funds Count Size
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆jpc 0.384*** 1.816*** 0.242*** 0.397 0.126*** 0.602***
(0.052) (0.581) (0.031) (0.464) (0.022) (0.213)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE*Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Population weights YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240
R-squared 0.648 0.576 0.608 0.607 0.309 0.195
Municipalities 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
IV F-stat 39.49 39.49 39.49
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS and IV regressions. Odd columns show OLS estimates
while even columns show IV ones. The first two columns reports the baseline results as in table 2.3, but
with the outcome measured as level. Columns 3-6 reports the coefficient from the same regressions with
the outcomes being the number of projects in columns 3 and 4, and the average project size in column 5
and 6. All other notes of table 2.7 apply. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6 Conclusion
Place-based policies are often used by governments as interventions to foster eco-
nomic growth in lagging regions. A growing literature has studied the consequences
of these policies theoretically and empirically (see for instance Ham et al., 2011;
Busso, Gregory, and Kline, 2013; Kline and Moretti, 2014a; Duranton and Venables,
2018). The evidence suggests that place-based policies can generate non-negligible
distortions in economic behaviour so that in aggregate terms the welfare effect are
ambiguous. Especially when designed on the basis of equity arguments, it is unclear
why this type of policies should be preferred to person-based interventions (Neumark
and Simpson, 2015).
I propose shifting the attention to the actual implementation of these policies
and identifying whether there is evidence for any economic rationale at all. In
this paper, I study if and how local economic growth influenced the allocation of
CasMez, a very large place-based policy which took place in Southern Italy for
more than 40 years after WWII. I build a novel municipality-level dataset covering
the whole period of CasMez activity and combine it with relevant socio-economic
variables from the industry and population censuses. Since local economic growth is
endogenous to the policy, I instrument local labor demand shocks with the aggregate
growth at the industry level weighted by local industry structure in the baseline
period, following Bartik (1991). I find that areas with better growth prospects and
with higher growth rates received more funds during the entire period. Moreover, I
demonstrate that the spatial distribution of projects is independent of local growth
rates and that the effect is coming from bigger investments being allocated to better
performing municipalities.
This paper constitutes the very first attempt to systematically investigate
the allocation of the universe of CasMez projects from a micro perspective. I con-
tribute to the long-standing debate on CasMez and provide robust evidence that
the targeting mechanism differed from the original intentions and often did respond
to local economic shocks albeit in the favour of prospering areas. There are several
ways of interpreting my findings. First, policy-makers might have intentionally tar-
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geted better performing municipalities in the hope of getting higher returns per unit
of public money invested. Secondly, the common narrative regards CasMez as an
extra-ordinary intervention in the original plans but as an ordinary one in practice,
meaning that it had to substitute standard national policies (Svimez, 2015). Finally,
these findings might be consistent with predictions from political economy models
that good economic times in developing countries encourage fiscal profligacy and/or
rent-seeking activities(Ilzetzki, 2011; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008). Even
though the data does not allow disentangling these different channels, my results
suggest that the allocation mechanism followed by CasMez might have contributed
to its partial failure. This is motivated by evidence that marginal increases in
employment induced by shocks to labor demand can be very high in areas were un-
employment has historically been low (Bartik, 2014; Austin, Glaeser, and Summers,
2018). There is a possibility then that CasMez might have proven more effective
had it targeted deprived areas rather than those which were already prospering.
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2.A Data
2.A.1 CasMez and municipality borders
In this section I briefly describe how I have constructed municipality-level data from
the project-level data on CasMez. The data covers the whole period of CasMez
activity and is the basis for other research projects (see chapter 1 of this thesis).
The raw dataset consist of four datasets, one for each type of CasMez’ project:
industrial grants, industrial loans, public works and special projects. For the the
first two datasets each project entry is associated to a firm and its location. Matching
the project to municipality is then straight-forward. However, for public works and
special projects not all entries are matched to a single municipalities. Some entries
are in fact recorded as pluricomunali, i.e. multi-municipalities. The next section
explains how I deal with them.
For determining the time dimension of the projects I use a combination of
the date-related fields available in the datasets. In fact, for each projects there is
a starting date, an end date and sometimes an acceptance date. As often there
are missing values I use the earliest date between starting and acceptance date to
determine the year in which the project is allocated to the municipality. Projects
for which no date is available are excluded from the sample.
A critical part of the construction of the dataset is that projects are recorded
for municipality borders as of 2011. However, there have been many changes to these
borders over 40 years of history and it is important to correctly track them, also to
then link CasMez’ dataset to the censuses. For consistently defining a municipality
identifier, I keep the largest units over time and, if there are aren’t, I keep the oldest
unit. In particular, I follow these criteria:
• If a municipality is created after 1951 out of a pre-existing municipality I
substitute the current identifier with the pre-existing identifier;
• If a municipality is created after 1951 out of multiple pre-existing munici-
palities which do not exist anymore then I attribute the new identifier to
pre-existing municipalities in the census data,
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• If a municipality is created after 1951 out of multiple pre-existing municipali-
ties which still exist then I cannot track them. This is a very rare case anyways
(15 municipalities in my sample).
2.A.2 Allocation of pluricomunali projects to municipalities
General criteria Even if multi-municipality projects consist of only 10% of the
overall number of projects, they make up 48% of the money invested in public works
and 37% of overall money during the 40 years of activity of CasMez. I allocate more
than half of these projects, ending up covering 85% of public works money and
almost 90 % of overall money. To do so I employ first a string routine in the main
dataset and then manual allocation. Once I have identified the target area, I use both
arithmetic mean and weighted-by population mean to distribute the projects funds
across municipalities. Results provided do not change when using either measures.
The routine is based on extraction of municipalities’ names from string-
variables describing the projects. However, this is possible only for 12% of the
overall money, as many projects have an incomplete list or refer to a geographic
areas only. I then manually identify the involved municipalities either by man-
ual search of the area of interest or, when this is not possible, through GIS18. To
make the manual allocation more efficient, I start from largest projects. For both
routine-based and manual allocations, I adopt the following general criteria:
• Include incomplete works
• Stick to the province mentioned in the dataset if:
– work seems to affect other provinces;
– need to disentangle between subsets of municipalities;
– the amount of municipalities involved is not clear but a main one is
specified in the project name;
• For aqueducts:
18I thank Rory Nealon for his extremely precious help on this.
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– if the project does not specify sections of the aqueduct scheme, I obtain
list of irrigated municipalities from official documents of ISPRA (if avail-
able) or from web search (often it is the website of company dealing with
the aqueduct at the moment);
– if the project does not specify sections of the aqueduct scheme but speci-
fies an area (not in administrative terms) of intervention then I do a web
search of municipalities being part of the area;
• If projects seems large enough and the province involved is specified, I give to
all municipalities in that province.
GIS routine I extracted geographical features from OpenStreetMap (OpenStreetMap
contributors, 2017) through overpass-turbo and analysed them with QGIS, via the
following routine:
• Identify the main geographic keywords for several types of geographic refer-
ences:
– River: one keyword only which is the river name
– Aqueduct: at least two keywords which identify the aqueduct’s path
– Dam: one keyword that is often the name of the artificial lake.
– Road: two keywords that represent the municipalities at the extremes of
the road.
• Locate the geographic features of the keywords in OpenStreetMap
• Query the feature(s) in Overpass turbo and export the data as a geojson and
clean in QGIS
• For features that are lines calculate the share of length for each municipality
and allocate the money with respect to this share
• For polygon features calculate the area of the different clipped polygons and
then calculated the share for each municipality and allocate the money with
respect to this share
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2.B Additional results
Table 2.9: IV results with spatial trends
Outcome variable: growth rate of CasMez funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆jpc 0.950*** 1.179* 0.865** 0.916*** 0.915*** 0
0.320
0.895** 0.959***
(0.292) (0.629) (0.374) (0.353) (0.303) (0.341) (0.356) (0.295)
Municipality trends NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
CZ trends NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Province trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Region trends NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
CZ X time trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Province x time trends NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Region X time trends NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240 11240
R-squared 0.520 0.497 0.547 0.532 0.526 0.749 0.605 0.542
Clusters 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
IV F- stat 39.49 21.41 30.90 31.77 35.85 25.68 34.83 40.84
Notes: The table reports coefficients from IV regressions. The first column reproduces the baseline results
as in table 2.3. Columns 2-8 report the coefficients obtained by adding different fixed effect to control for
non-linear trends. The instrument is the weighted average of growth of plants per capita in 3-digits sectors
in the whole South. All columns include time fixed effect and controls interacted with time fixed effects.
Observations are weighted by population in 1951.The controls included are measured at the beginning
of the sample period and are: share of resident population that is illiterate, share of households with no
access to water, log of resident population, log of municipality area in squared km, population density,
share of resident population active in agriculture, average altitude in metres, a dummy for coastal areas.
The F-stat from the first stage is reported. The units of observation are municipalities in 5 points in time.
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Heterogeneous results: initial JPC-quintiles





∆jpc * q2 0.139*** 0.116
(0.053) (0.083)
∆jpc * q3 0.156*** 0.173
(0.050) (0.107)
∆jpc * q4 0.221*** 0.249*
(0.050) (0.145)
∆jpc * q5 0.264*** 0.911***
(0.076) (0.255)
Time FE*Controls YES YES




Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS and IV regressions. The independent variable
is interacted with dummies for each quintile of the distribution JPC in 1951.The instrument
is the weighted average of growth of plants per capita in 3-digits sectors in the whole South.
The controls included are measured at the beginning of the sample period and are: share
of resident population that is illiterate, share of households with no access to water, log of
resident population, log of municipality area in squared km, population density, share of
resident population active in agriculture, average altitude in metres, a dummy for coastal
areas. The units of observation are municipalities in 5 points in time. Standard errors
clustered at municipality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: JPC and PPC by sector: north vs south-every 1000 inhabitants
Code Description JPC North JPC South PPC North PPC South
2010 MET MINERALS 0.496 0.803 5.284 6.668
2020 NON MET MIN. 2.186 2.686 198.2 217.6
3010 FOOD & BEV 8.285 9.906 1586 2699
3020 TOBACCO 0.946 1.634 11.28 36.85
3030 LEATHER 1.193 0.356 182.3 141.7
3040 TEXTILE 23.06 1.813 1338 340.3
3050 CLOTHES & SHOES 10.74 8.161 5431 5505
3060 WOOD & FURN. 8.387 5.613 2849 2970
3070 PAPER GOODS 2.214 0.333 73.26 19.29
3080 EDITING AND PRESS 2.636 0.546 233.6 106.6
3090 PHOTO & VIDEOS 0.343 0.170 156.3 123.0
3100 METALLURG 5.232 0.724 37.58 3.728
3110 MECHANICS 30.87 6.067 3649 2423
3120 NON MET. MIN. PROD 6.418 2.610 459.3 456.8
3130 PETROCHEM 6.845 1.211 212.4 104.0
3140 RUBBERS 1.554 0.0516 57.69 20.51
3150 PLASTICS 2.027 0.154 140.5 29.54
4010 CONSTR. 16.13 7.995 1298 650.4
5010 ELECT. & GAS 2.365 1.144 154.0 108.1
5020 WATER 0.281 0.334 68.18 50.98
6010 WHOLESALE TRADE 7.602 3.272 2373 1131
6020 RETAIL TRADE 26.59 20.17 13152 12282
6030 HOSPITALITY 9.326 4.521 4149 1988
7010 TRANSPORTS 13.10 8.701 1838 1533
7020 COMMS 3.473 2.206 225.0 207.7
8010 BANKING 2.610 1.459 265.7 131.4
8020 INSURANCE 0.792 0.127 111.0 44.17
9010 SERVICES TO FIRMS 2.801 1.969 1432 899.8
9020 ENTERTAINMENT 1.336 0.796 290.6 182.4
9030 HYG & CLEANING 3.279 3.662 1759 1709
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Chapter 3




Public support aimed at fostering private innovation activities is a common practice
in almost every OECD country. In 2015, governments across the OECD invested on
average the equivalent of nearly 0.17% of GDP in direct funding for R&D (OECD,
2017)1. The instruments typically used to promote R&D include direct grants or
loans, governmental labs, R&D public contracts with private firms and tax incen-
tives. In particular, governments devote large resources to support smaller firms or
start-ups. The economic rationale behind this is that start-ups face higher marginal
cost of innovation and stronger credit constraints (Hall, 1996; Hall and Lerner, 2010).
This is particularly true for firms operating in the high-tech sectors (Guiso, 1998).
The empirical literature on the effects of public funding for R&D activities
is in general very vast and results differ significantly across types of programmes or
countries (for instance see Lerner, 2000; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Einiö, 2014).
High-tech start-ups have not received a lot of attention so far2, even though they
can be of particular interest. First, start-ups have higher application costs and
fewer application opportunities than regular recipients of public grants. Established
companies often regard subsidies as a regular source of external cash flow rather
than as an incentive, whereas for start-ups they can be a one-shot, potentially
transformative opportunity. Young firms are then less likely to fund inframarginal
projects. Secondly, since both marginal costs of innovation and credit constraints
are higher for smaller firms, their response to receiving a subsidy can be interpreted
as an upper bound of the response of larger or more mature firms.
This paper provides insights into the causal effect of public R&D support
to start-ups. For this end, I exploit a unique quasi-experimental setting in the
allocation of a direct subsidy introduced by the Italian government in 2009 which
was targeted at high-tech start-ups. The scheme offered refund of up to 50% of the
total costs of highly technological projects and comprised average transfers of almost
1 million euros per firm. I estimate the impact of this programme on innovation
1The average among countries in the top quintile of the funding distribution goes up to 0.36%.
2See, for a notable exception, Howell (2017).
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activities of the subsidised firms using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)3.
In particular, I exploit the score that each applicant firm received after applying for
the grant to compare the firms that just received the grant to the ones that did not.
One of the main challenges of using RDD is to establish that the assignment
to the treatment around the cut-off is as good as random. In the context of score-
based rankings of applications, this assumes that marginal applicants cannot signal
or manipulate their position around the threshold. Virtually all related papers
using score-based rankings in an RDD setting have assessed the validity of this
crucial assumption by investigating discontinuities in the number or characteristics
of the applicants on either side of the cut-off (see for instance, Bronzini and Iachini,
2014). However, even if scoring procedures are often ruled by precise guidelines, it
is in practice exactly around the threshold that scoring committees can exert their
discretionary power. In this case, the observations may not be randomly allocated
around the cut-off and instead may be determined by unobservable factors that could
also affect the outcome variable. In other words, the presence of a cut-off score that
is exogenous to the applicants does not necessarily rule out non-random sorting as
the cut-off may still be endogenous to the policy-maker. Such type of sorting may
go undetected by standard tests of balance across treatment and control groups.
In this paper, I address this issue by exploiting the interaction between the
specific scoring procedure of the programme and the exogenous supply of funds. The
score determining the treatment was assigned to each application by a committee
made up of experts of technological innovation. The crucial feature of this setting
is that the cut-off score was not determined ex-ante. Rather, the score above which
firms received subsidies was determined by the supply of funding allocated to this
programme by the central government. Consequently, the committee was arguably
blind to the cut-off and unlikely to determine ex-ante which firms would receive
the grant. In fact, some firms did not receive the subsidy because of the funding
constraint although they obtained exactly the same score as other treated firms.
I quantify the impact of the subsidy in this setup by using balance sheet
3This is not the first paper using RD for evaluating the impact of public funds on private firms.
See, for instance Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) or Bronzini and Iachini (2014).
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and patenting data and comparing R&D inputs and outputs for firms on both sides
of the threshold. In particular, I focus on the share of intangibles out of total
assets (intangibles’ intensity) as a proxy for R&D expenses and on applications for
patents as a proxy for R&D outcome. I measure the causal effect of the grant using
both parametric and non-parametric estimations. My results show that the average
intensity of the intangibles after the treatment is not different between treated and
untreated firms. However, there is a positive and significant effect in the first two
years after the publication of the ranking. In these years, firms that received the
grant devoted a 20% higher share of total assets to intangibles. I do not find any
significant effect on patenting activity, even if there is partial evidence for a decrease
in patent applications after the treatment in treated firms. The results are exposed
to several limitations deriving from the sample size and measurement issues but
suggest that the subsidy might have increased investments in R&D at least in the
short-run.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
predictions of the theory and relevant empirical findings to outline the contribution
of this study. Section 3.3 provides some information on the grant programme and
section 3.4 describes the datasets used in the analysis. Section 3.5 explains the iden-
tification strategy and section 3.6 presents the main results. Section 3.7 interprets
the results and provides the conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
The economic rationale for public support of innovation lies in two main poten-
tial market failures, namely underprovision of investments in innovation and credit
constraints (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). The first market failure arises because
knowledge is a public good for which the social marginal return is higher than the
private one (Griliches, 1986; Hall, 1996). This can be combined with the stylised fact
(Hall and Lerner, 2010) that R&D spending at firm level usually behaves as it had
high adjustment costs, especially because at least half of this spending translates
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into higher remunerations of human capital4 so the private marginal return required
in equilibrium might be too high. The government can then decrease the marginal
cost of innovation projects through direct subsidies or tax credit. When it comes
to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or start-ups, this argument is strictly con-
nected to market power: the present value of an R&D investment is potentially a
negative function of firms’ size or market position because it is harder for the firms
to prevent other competitors from having access to the innovative results5.
However, even if innovations could be fully appropriated, information asym-
metries between entrepreneurs and external investors are particularly high when it
comes to intangible capital for three main reasons. First, research investments can
be extremely risky and the cost of external capital can be too high for the firms.
This is again especially true for small firms that can easily be deterred from under-
taking projects with a positive net present value (Hall, 2002). Second, the strategic
nature of this kind of investments can increase the degree of asymmetric information
when the firm is keen to conceal the innovative characteristics of its project. Finally,
intangible capital cannot be used as collateral. The government can intervene by
partly substituting the private capital market and providing funding for the firms.
Government intervention can also generate several positive externalities. If
the innovation process involves upgrading general research facilities, a government
subsidy would decrease the fixed cost of the firms to undertake other private R&D
projects. Also, spillover effects can arise both within and across firms6 and the
ability of the firm to obtain public funding may have positive signalling effect on
the private capital market7.
The effectiveness of subsidies, however, strongly depends upon policy mak-
ers’ ability to target marginal projects which is to say those projects which would
4Firms try to avoid having to lay off knowledge workers. This implies a tendency to smooth
R&D spending over time.
5The innovation literature looks at the effect of patenting normative on innovation activities.
See, among others, Moser (2005).
6The predictions in this case are actually quite ambiguous as I discuss when reviewing the
empirical literature.
7The validity of this prediction is of course substantially dependent on the type of funding and
on public administration’s reputation and credibility.
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have not been undertaken in absence of the intervention. Noticeably, the govern-
ment faces the same asymmetries of the private capital market. Every firm may de
facto have an incentive to apply for public grants in spite of its capacities in terms
of internal funding or appropriability. If the government reaches infra-marginal
projects, then public investments crowd out private ones and the equilibrium in-
vestment level does not change in comparison to a scenario without government
intervention. This is very likely to be the case if policies are implemented according
to a picking-the-winner criterion, especially given the reputation benefit that policy
makers might gain from a successful subsidy programme. Similarly, if the incentive
is based on a helping-the-losers strategy (for instance, in the attempt of encouraging
R&D investments in small or more financially constrained firms), inefficient firms
might be supported. Moreover, Goolsbee (1998) finds that the crowding-out effect
can also involve private inventive activity even in firms that do not directly receive
support. As the supply of scientific and engineering skills is inelastic, a large public
subsidy can have a general equilibrium effect on the prices of research inputs and
the funding is more likely to be routed into rewarding human capital than increasing
innovation.
According to economic theory then, the effect of public R&D support to
private firms is ambiguous and that is why the literature developed around this
issue on a mainly empirical ground. However, the question is as difficult to address
empirically as it is theoretically. Several methodologies, datasets and contexts have
been employed in the literature especially in the last two decades. The main obstacle
to a credible identification strategy is that subsidised firms are not randomly chosen8.
Government agencies often base funding allocation on factors that the researcher
does not observe and that can be correlated with the future performance of the
firms. Moreover, R&D activities are intangible and identifying them within a firm
can be challenging when working with firm level data or misleading when working
with survey data. Measuring innovation with patenting data only is also believed
8As mentioned above, I am focusing here on direct funding. Tax credit or other indirect fiscal
tools meant to foster R&D investments are commonly based on more “automatic” selection criteria
that still create similar endogeneity issues.
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to be an incomplete approach (Nagaoka, Motohashi, and Goto, 2010; Moser, 2012,
2013). Many studies focus on innovation outputs (such as the general performance
of the firm or productivity) rather than inputs to overcome the aforementioned
measurement issues. Finally, an important threat to the estimation of the effect of
the subsidies is the presence of spatial and industry spillovers. In particular, this
can be a potential problem in many matching-based methodologies; by using not
subsidised firms to create a counterfactual for subsidised ones might lead to neglect
that a negative(positive) estimated effect could actually prove the success (failure)
of the subsidy because of the presence of positive (negative) spillovers.
There is a very vast empirical literature to which the current study makes
a contribution. David, Hall, and Toole (2000) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014)
amongst others have brought together and analysed all the empirical studies of the
last 30 years in order to design a more precise path for future research. Here, I focus
on the works that are more closely related to mine, firstly in terms of identification
strategy and secondly in terms of institutional context. Lach (2002), using survey
and performance data on Israeli manufacturing firms and a Difference-in-Difference,
finds that R&D grants increase innovative activities in small firms but not in large
ones. At the time, the approach was novel and the dataset broad; however, the
counterfactual for the subsidised firms is made up of both firms that applied for
but did not get the grant and firms that did not apply for the grant. Noticeably,
firms that apply for R&D subsidy can systematically differ from firms that do not
apply. Busom (2000) finds evidence for significant crowding-out effects when esti-
mating a structural model on a sample of Spanish firms. Her contribution lies in
the estimation of a participation equation that formalises both public agencies’ goal
and applicants’ characteristics. Einiö (2014) employs a well-conceived identification
based on the variation in government funding arising from the allocation of EU
Regional Development Funds in Finland. He then identifies the causal effect of the
programme, exploiting the variation in the probability of R&D support programme
participation. He finds positive effects on both innovation and productivity. The re-
sults from Finland might not be, however, very representative. Finland, Sweden and
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Denmark are the only EU Members with an R&D expenditures-GDP ratio larger
than 3%9.
Few papers have looked at the effect of public funding for R&D on firms in
Italy. Using a matching model, Merito, Giannangeli, and Bonaccorsi (2010) analyse
a Special Grant awarded in 2000 to some innovative firms and found no effect on
employment, sales and productivity. Employing non-parametric matching, Carboni
(2011) finds that recipient firms achieve more private R&D than the counterfactual.
The closest papers to this work are Bronzini and Iachini (2014) and Bronzini and
Piselli (2016). They apply RDD to a subsidy with an allocation procedure similar
to mine and find a positive effect on small firms only, also in terms of patenting.
Two factors distinguish my work from theirs. First, I look at a national programme
and not a regional one. Second, and most importantly, their cut-off score is prede-
termined. The authors show the inability of the firms to manipulate the score but
cannot rule out the discretionary power of the committee.
3.3 Context
The Innovative Start-ups Industrial Research Program10 was launched by the Italian
Ministry for the Economic Development on July 2009 with the intention to sustain
experimental development and industrial research projects of start-ups in high and
medium-high technological sectors. The Ministry allocated 55 million Euros, 20 mil-
lions of which originated from the European Structural Funds and were earmarked
to firms active in the four Convergence Regions11.
Figure 3.1 shows the timeline of events from the call for applications to the
publication of the final ranking. Firms with less than 5 years of activity could
apply, also jointly with research institutes, for the grant by presenting projects with
specific budget plan and technical details not sooner than two and no later than five
months after the call for applications was announced. The eligibility of the projects
9That is even above the target set by Lisbon Strategy.
10Decree 7 July 2009 - FIT, alta e media tecnologia. Published on 25 July 2009.
11These are the Regions whose per capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU and they are Calabria,
Campania, Puglia and Sicilia.
110
was related to three main criteria. First, the projects had to be strictly linked to
development of product and/or process innovations in the following technological
sectors: biotechnologies, ICT, innovative materials, robotics and energy innovation.
Secondly, the request for the grant had to be related to the coverage of specific
R&D costs: long or short term contracts for hiring researchers, purchase of tools
and machinery, use of consulting services, fees for filing of patents, raw materials
and general expenditures up to 30% of the personnel cost. Finally, the projects had
to start after the submission of the application. This is a crucial feature of the
programme, that rules out crowding-out effects within a firm.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of application process
Once the projects were submitted, the Ministry selected a committee of 5
people listed in the official register of experts in technological innovation12. The
register was formed in 2006 through a public competition targeted at academics,
members of public research institutes and high-qualified individuals with experience
of at least 10 years in research evaluation and management in different technological
12See the Ministry’s decree 7/4/2006.
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areas. The committee compiled a ranking of projects according to the following
scoring criteria:
• maximum of 15 points for the degree of innovation of the project;
• maximum 5 points for the past R&D activity13;
• 5% bonus increase for product innovation or partnerships with research insti-
tutes or female ownership of the firm14.
Noticeably, the score was mainly project-specific rather than firm-specific, indicating
again that the committee did not have a priori preferences over which firms to
subsidise. Up to approximately the 150th position of the ranking, all firms were
given the maximum score for the relevance of R&D expenditures in past financial
years, thereby suggesting that this criterion was almost negligible in the scoring
procedure. Between projects receiving equal scores, the ranking was determined
on the basis of economic efficiency; thus the cheaper projects received a higher
ranking. The grant was finally assigned to the highest ranked projects up till the
point wherein available national funds were used up. The most relevant feature of
this procedure is that the committee could not know, ex-ante, how the score would
have affected the application outcome of the projects.
The final ranking was announced on April 2011, with one year delay with
respect to the intended date: out of 411 presented projects, 65 were selected to
receive public support. The grant was substantial. In fact, it could cover costs
up to 2 million Euros per firm. Awardee firms had to start the project within 6
months from ranking publication if they wanted to prevent revocation of the grant.
The support was granted either through direct funding or through a loan with
favourable credit terms15. The direct subsidy could cover up to 20% of eligible costs
for large firms, 30% for medium-sized firms and 40% for small firms16. The loan
13Measured as R&D expenditures reaching 15% of operative expenditures in one of the 3 years
preceding the application.
14In particular firms needed to have contracts with research institutes for at least 20% of the
eligible costs or projects needed to be jointly presented with research institutes.
15According to a dialogue with Ministry’s officers, this was around 1.2% interest rate.
16The reference framework to define firms’ size is given by the European committee (L 124/36,
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could instead cover up to 50% of costs for all firm sizes. Overall, the total cost of
admitted projects was of 130 million of Euros, 55 of which was fully covered by the
public intervention.
Other features of the programme are relevant to the identification strategy
presented in this work. First, this subsidy was operating at a national level. This is
a rare characteristic as most of the interventions to innovation activities have been in
the last decade decentralised to local or federal governments. From a methodological
point of view, the most crucial benefits of a national programme over a regional one
are that: i) national programmes generate less spillovers of the treatment within
the sample of applicants17; ii) national programmes are more centralised and less
likely to create room for informal relationships between candidates and committee18.
Finally, firms could not apply to other funding (neither national nor regional ones)
or receive any other kind of public aid. This allows me to isolate the impact of this
intervention.
3.4 Data
This work is based on a novel panel dataset of the firms that applied for the grant.
To construct this dataset I have used three data sources. First, I have obtained the
administrative dataset of the Ministry of Economic Development that contains in-
formation about firms, presented projects, detailed score, cost of the project, grant
amount and main applicant in case of joint applications. Secondly, I have collected
firm-level data for 9 financial years between 2008 and 2016 from the AIDA database
offered by Bureau Van Dijk. AIDA contains comprehensive balance sheet informa-
tion and has a wide coverage of companies in Italy. Finally, I have constructed a
dataset with the universe of patent applications and publication dates of the firms
2003): small firms have less than 50 employees and either turnover or Balance Sheet total less than
10 million Euros. Medium firms have less than 250 employees and either turnover less than 50
million or Balance Sheet total of less than 43 million.
17On the other hand, as for regional programmes, the behaviour of the not-funded firms is
unknown.
18A national intervention can, however, be exposed to political pressures to make geographically
diverse awards.
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in the sample between 2007 and 2017. In order to do so, I have used web-scraped
techniques to systematically search for the firms’ names as assignee or inventors of
the patents.
The final sample obtained by merging these three sources together excludes
partnerships and research institutes that are not covered by AIDA and consists of
361 firms, that correspond to 88% of the applicants. For joint applications, I have
considered the data related to the main applicant as recorded in the administrative
dataset. The coverage of successful applicants is slightly lower but large enough as
there is data for 55 out of 65 subsidised firms. The final panel is not balanced as
44% of the firms were estabilished between 2008 and 2009 and 12.5% were already
inactive in 2013. Moreover, even if the firms survived, not all entries are always
reported in AIDA; thus I can consistently measure the main outcome in every year
for only 70% of the surviving firms. Overall, when I consider the balanced panel
that includes only firms that exist and have balance sheet data of good quality in the
2009-2016 period, the sample drops to 183 firms. Figure 3.2 shows how the number
of firms with good data quality drastically varies over years. For statistical power
but also as the survival of firms and quality of data can be an outcome, I implement
the main analysis on the unbalanced panel, but I carry out some robustness checks
on the balanced sample.
To measure innovation, I look at both R&D inputs and outputs. AIDA does
not provide the notes for the accounts in which firms are obliged to describe the
R&D activities. I then proxy R&D expenditures, or inputs, with the investments in
intangibles fixed assets. According to the law19, this balance sheet entry can include:
startup expenses, R&D and advertising costs, cost of patents, alternative intellectual
property rights and other intangible assets. I construct the main outcome variable,
namely intangibles’ intensity, by scaling the stock of intangible fixed assets in each
year by the total amount of fixed assets at the end of the previous accounting year.
A concern in using this balance sheet entry is that cost capitalisation, i.e. labelling
costs which are not related to capital investment as such, can be a strategic decision
19Italian Civil Code, articles 2424-2426.
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Figure 3.2: Number of firms with no missing values by reporting year
for firms and can be influenced by many unobservables.
As the main R&D output, I consider patents published up to July 2018 at
the European Patent Office. As patents take on average three years to be published,
I consider the date of the application and not of the publication. A limitation of this
measure is that I can only observe patent applications that have been successful. As
the sample is made of start-ups, only 32% of the firms in my sample have applied for
at least one patent. Moreover, this goes down to 23% if I exclude patents filed before
2009. For this reason, I construct a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm applied for
at least one patent, to investigate the effect of the subsidy on the extensive margin of
patenting. Figure 3.8 in the Appendix shows the distribution of patent applications.
The largest proportion of firms have filed at most 2 applications, and only very few
firms have filed more than 20.
Because of attrition and missing values for balance sheet entries, the balanced
panel is very small and equal to 183 observations. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 compare
the main variables of interest between the unbalanced and balanced panel. The
first table is based on the time period pre-publication of the ranking, while the
second table is based on the post-publication period. These tables provide two main
insights. First, there seems to be an increase in balance sheet entries after the
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics by sample: 2009-2010
Unbalanced Balanced
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Tangible fixed assets 1323.81 10192.57 684 1836.37 13471.60 366
Intangible fixed assets 614.46 3566.65 685 756.42 4363.51 366
Total assets 5063.25 27671.08 684 7025.83 36050.61 366
Intangibles’ Intensity 0.18 0.23 684 0.15 0.20 366
Sales 2745.71 15013.15 682 3419.20 17665.49 366
Value of production 2932.62 15531.28 682 3631.77 18115.62 366
Profit or loss −100.72 1063.32 684 −153.93 1425.05 366
Time-invariant
Patents up to 2008 0.74 3.05 722 0.86 3.24 366
Patents, 2009-12 0.95 3.47 722 1.18 3.79 366
Patents, 2013-17 0.21 0.85 722 0.32 1.11 366
Less than 50 empl 0.07 0.26 722 0.10 0.30 366
Less than 250 empl 0.03 0.17 722 0.04 0.19 366
Southern regions 0.25 0.43 722 0.22 0.42 366
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics by sample: 2011-2016
Unbalanced Balanced
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Tangible fixed assets 3661.82 37876.92 1613 5060.45 45801.73 1098
Intangible fixed assets 721.82 3461.39 1613 853.08 4047.36 1098
Total assets 8282.73 56703.00 1613 11051.97 68433.27 1098
Intangibles’ Intensity 0.17 0.23 1613 0.15 0.20 1098
Sales 3980.20 22325.36 1613 5385.55 26856.80 1098
Value of production 4380.86 23880.71 1613 5916.58 28725.55 1098
Profit or loss −267.10 3934.74 1613 −310.67 4312.19 1098
Time-invariant
Patents up to 2008 0.74 3.05 2166 0.86 3.23 1098
Patents, 2009-12 0.95 3.47 2166 1.18 3.79 1098
Patents, 2013-17 0.21 0.84 2166 0.32 1.11 1098
Less than 50 empl 0.07 0.26 2166 0.10 0.30 1098
Less than 250 empl 0.03 0.17 2166 0.04 0.19 1098
Southern regions 0.25 0.43 2166 0.22 0.42 1098
Notes: These tables show summary statistics for the main balance sheet and patenting data. The balanced
sample is restricted to observations for which Intangibles’ intensity can be observed in each year between
2009 and 2016. The number of observations is equal to the number of firms*number of years.
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publication of the ranking in both unbalanced and balanced samples. Secondly,
the firms in the balanced sample are noticeably larger and patent more. This is
not surprising as larger firms tend to have better reporting practices and, most
importantly, have more reporting obligations than smaller firms. The implications
of using these two different samples are discussed in more detail in the following
sections.
3.5 Identification Strategy
This section describes in detail the identification strategy and its validity in this
unique setting. As already mentioned, I use an RDD by exploiting the final score
firms received as the forcing variable. As the treatment, which is winning the sub-
sidy, is a deterministic function of the score received, I apply a sharp RDD. Firms
that did not get the subsidy but got a score close to cut-off one are a proper coun-
terfactual for the subsidised firms with a score just above the cut-off. If some
assumptions are met, then the treatment status around the threshold is randomised
as though from randomised experiments (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) and any potential
discontinuity gap at the cut-off identifies the causal effect of the treatment. Section
3.5.1 explores the validity assumptions for RDD and tests them in the context of
this paper. Section 3.5.2 outlines how the treatment effect is estimated.
3.5.1 Validity of RDD
One of the main challenges in RDD is the potential manipulation of the running
variable. However, the setting of the programme studied here allows to rule out any
form of non-random sorting around the cut-off. As a matter of fact, the committee
was ex-ante unaware of the cut-off score. To be more specific, a precise threshold
was actually never determined. More than 10 firms received a score of 18.9 out of
20; however, only 6 of them were assigned the grant because of unavailability of
extra funds, subsequent to being ranked from the cheapest to the most expensive
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project20. The cut-off is then likely to be exogenous to firms’ characteristics but
this can anyway be tested empirically.
First, if the cut-off is not exogenous because individuals are able to deter-
mine the value of the score to be on one side of the cut-off, then one might observe
a discontinuity in the density distribution of the forcing variable at the threshold.
Figure 3.3 plots the density distribution of firms with the score normalised to be
centered at 0. The distribution around the cut-off score is smooth. Also, the Mc-
Crary test (McCrary, 2008) leads to a t-ratio of 1.1 and thus fails to reject the null
hypothesis of continuity of the density.
To check whether firms below the cut-off can be a proper counterfactual
for the ones above, I produce RD plots for a bunch of relevant covariates and for
the outcome variables in the pre-publication period21. In particular, I divide the
assignment variable, i.e. score, into bins and for each variable I plot its average
weighted by the number of observations in the bin against the midpoint of each
bin. I also add a quadratic fit with confidence bands for the raw data (allowed to
be different on the two sides of the cut-off) to aid visualisation of the shape of the
underlying function. These plots can usually help to identify differences in the firms
at the cut-off but in this context their informative power is limited by the extremely
small size of the sample, especially above the cut-off. Figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11
in the Appendix show that the cost and value of production22 and the turnover
are very similar across the cut-off. The confidence bands are quite large especially
for treated firms: the small sample size of course contributes to a decrease in the
precision of the fit and graphs should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Finally, figure 3.4 shows the same plots for the outcomes. For patents, the
plot shows the number of applications filed up to the end of 2010. For intangibles’
intensity, the plot shows the average over the 2007-2010 period23. For patents, the
20See table 3.6 in the Appendix for a replication of the final ranking.
21Similar results are obtained by placebo estimations that are reported in the results section
22These two variables represent the main entries in the Income statement (on the revenues and on
the cost side). Graphs for other variables look similar but are not reported for the sake of brevity.
They are available upon request.
23The graphs look identical when restricting to the balanced sample.
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Figure 3.3: Density distribution of the running variable The graph also
shows the plot of kernel density estimates.
graph is not very informative as most of the observations are around 0. In any case,
there does not seem to be any jump above the cut-off. For intangibles’ intensity
instead, observations above the cut-off seem to have lower intangibles’ intensity val-
ues on average. Figure 3.12 in the Appendix shows that this difference seems to be
driven by the years 2008 and 2009 and to peter out in 2010. In addition, placebo
estimations suggest that the difference is not significant. Still, this potential dis-
continuity must be borne in mind when interpreting the results as it might suggest
that the economic criterion of picking cheaper projects has resulted in the selection
of worse firms. On the other hand, as other balance sheet entries and patent ap-
plications are balanced across the threshold, this result might just derive from the
inaccuracy of this metric.
3.5.2 Empirical model
To study the effect of the subsidy on patenting and investment in intangibles I first
pool the observations before and after 201024 and estimate the treatment effect in
24I assume that as the ranking was published in April 2011, 2011 is potentially a post-treatment
period.
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Figure 3.4: RD plots for outcome variables in the pre-
treatment period These graphs show the average of the vari-
able within bins of score in the the pre-treatment period. The
number of patents is cumulated while for intangibles’ intensity
the graph shows the mean over four years before the treatment.
The circles represent means within 10% bins and the lines and
shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence intervals based
on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of the cut-off.
these two time periods. Then, I carry an event-study like analysis by looking at how
the treatment effect changes year by year25. Finally, I look at whether the change
between the pre and the post period is different around the cut-off, to account for
time-invariant unobservables.
To estimate the treatment effect I employ both a parametric and a non-
parametric approach. In particular, I first estimate the following simple cross-
sectional parametric model on the whole sample in each time period:










i ∗ Treatedi) + εi (3.1)
25As anticipated in section 3.4, my data includes balance sheet up to 2016.
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In equation (3.1) Y is the outcome variable, Treated is a dummy treatment variable
that is equal to one when the firm wins the grant and zero otherwise, and Score
is the normalised running variable with the cut-off centred at 0. The interaction
terms allow the relationship between the outcome variable and the running one to
be different on the two sides of the discontinuity. At the cut-off, β measures the
treatment effect. For observations to the right of the cut-off score the additional
effect is given by (γ+δ).
Higher order terms for the running variable and their interactions with the
treatment dummy are included in the regression to allow for non-linearities between
the outcome and the score. A way to determine the optimal polynomial order is to
compute in each time period and for each outcome the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) for equation (3.1) letting p vary (up to 5). The model with the lowest AIC
should have the most preferable “bias-precision” trade-off. However, this criterion
delivers only relative comparisons between higher and lower order polynomials only.
Another way to test the different models against the data is to check for the joint
significance of a set of bin dummies added to equation (3.1) (Lee and Lemieux,
2010). The idea is that if these dummies are jointly significant the functional form
is failing to capture some patterns in the data and one has to increase the polynomial
order until failing to reject the null. Table 3.7 in the Appendix shows the results
of both procedures for intangibles’ intensity in the 2008-2012 period. Remarkably,
the bin dummies test and AIC lead to quite different results. Detecting the best
polynomial order is quite hard given the small number of observations and the high
variance in the treatment group. Recently, Gelman and Imbens (2018) have shown
that estimates obtained with lower order polynomials are more robust. In this paper,
I present results across different polynomial orders as a robustness test. In a RDD
context, the treatment status is, by construction, independent of control variables.
Yet, to reduce sampling variability in the estimates and to check for the robustness
of the results, I also estimate (3.1) including a set of time invariant covariates such
as size, sector of activity, administrative region and whether or not the project was
presented jointly with a research institute.
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For non-parametric estimations, I refer to the most recent literature and
estimate a local linear regression around the cut-off (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee
and Lemieux, 2010; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014). In particular, I run
a local linear kernel regression with triangular weighting, that assigns more weight
to the observations closer to the cut-off26. An important choice for non-parametric
regressions is how many observations around the cut-off should be included. The
bandwidth should be large enough to yield more precise estimates but narrow enough
to yield less biased estimates. Because of the small number of observations, I use
the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) that is larger
than the ones proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) and Calonico
et al. (2018).
On a final note, most of the results are derived from the unbalanced panel.
This is because of two main reasons. First, as described in section 3.4, the balanced
sample is almost half the size of the unbalanced one, and this can affect the statis-
tical power of the empirical analysis. In RD settings in particular, the number of
observations or clusters needed to detect a minimum effect is substantially larger
than the one needed under a randomised control trial (Schochet, 2009). Secondly,
firms for which data is of good quality in every year are also those that survive more
and tend to be larger and perform better than the others, as shown in table 3.2.
These factors can all be outcomes of treatment, thus estimations on the balanced
panel can be exposed to selection bias. Noticeably, the results from the unbalanced
panel can also be biased if missing values are not randomly determined. To quantify
this possibility I estimate (3.1) in each year using a dummy for missing value as the
outcome variable. The results are reported in table 3.8 in the Appendix and show
that there is no statistically significant correlation between the treatment dummy
and the quality of data of a firm in a given year.
26The difference with respect to a parametric regression around the cut-off is basically the weight-
ing that in the parametric regression is rectangular.
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3.6 Results
In this section, I show the main results from the graphical and statistical analyses
described in section 3.5. All findings are presented in comparison to the placebo
results for outcomes determined in the pre-treatment period before the final ranking
for the allocation of the subsidy was published. Figure 3.5 shows the RD plots
for both outcomes in the post-treatment period. A comparison between figure 3.4
and figure 3.5 seems to suggest that while the patenting activity has not changed
differentially for treated and untreated firms after the treatment, the same is not
true for intangibles’ intensity. In fact, the intensity of intangibles just above the
cut-off is on average lower than just below it before the publication of the ranking,
but higher thereafter. However, as the sample size is very small, especially above
the cut-off, the graphical analysis does not allow the drawing of definite conclusions.
Tables 3.3 provides the estimation counterpart of the RD plots. It shows the
OLS estimation of β in (3.1) for the two outcomes in the pre and post-treatment
periods, for a linear and a quadratic polynomial function of the running variable
and with and without controls. Panel A reports the results for the average inten-
sity of intangibles, while Panel B shows the results for the total number of patent
applications. The coefficients are unstable across different polynomial orders and
specifications. In general, however, there seems to be no statistically significant ef-
fect of the treatment on any of the two outcome variables, even if the coefficients
of intangibles’ intensity are consistently switching sign after the treatment27. The
binary model for patent applications also gives null results28.
To exploit the time-variation in the post-treatment period, I construct an
event-study analysis and estimate equation (3.1) in each year. Figure 3.6 shows the
coefficients from these regressions by 4 different polynomial orders. Strikingly, the
coefficients are negative and almost significant, depending on the polynomial order,
in 2008 and 2009 before the submission system was opened to applications. This
27Figures 3.13 and 3.14 in the Appendix show how coefficients stay insignificant up to the 6th
oder polynomial.
28These are not reported for the sake of space but available upon request.
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Figure 3.5: RD plots for outcome variables in the post-
treatment period These graphs show the average of the vari-
able within bins of score in the the post-treatment period. The
number of patents is measured on the 2011-2017 period while for
intangibles’ intensity the graph shows the mean between 2011
and 2016. The circles represent means within 10% bins and the
lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90% confidence in-
tervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side
of the cut-off.
can be problematic as it points to statistically significant differences between treated
and untreated firms before the treatment. In particular, the negative coefficients
suggest that the grant might have been allocated to firms with fewer R&D activities.
However, this does not seem plausible, given the context described in section 3.3:
one of the criteria for higher scores was a high level of R&D expenditures. Another
possible interpretation is that this reflects the rule according to which the cheapest
projects having attained the same scores would be preferred, as firms with low R&D
activity are plausibly more likely to present less ambitious R&D projects.
Bearing these caveats in mind, the year-by-year analysis identifies a positive
and significant effect of the subsidy in 2012 and 2013. This effect is however present
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in the short-run only. Given the nature of the refunding scheme, a natural inter-
pretation of these results is that the refund for the investments enters the balance
sheet in the form of intangible asset as soon as the firm receives it. However, it later
decreases because of capital depreciation29. In terms of magnitude, the coefficients
suggest that firms that received the R&D subsidy increased their intangibles-to-total
assets ratio by almost 20% in the immediate years following the publication of the
ranking. To test whether these results are driven by the stylised fact that most of
R&D subsidies translates into higher personnel cost, I do a similar event study using
the log of total wages paid as an outcome and do not find any significant result30.
To further address the robustness of these results, I estimate (3.1) using the
first difference of the outcomes as dependent variables, first between pre and post
treatment periods and then as an event study analysis. Figure 3.7 shows that, when
the outcome is the change between the average intangibles’ intensity before and
after the treatment, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant across
most polynomial orders. As before, there is an increase of 20% in the change in
intangibles’ intensity after the publication of the ranking for treated firms. On the
other hand, and consistently with the year-by-year analysis, the changes in number
of total patents filed is unaffected by the publication of the ranking.
To test whether these results are driven by the non-randomness of the missing
values, I replicate the analysis on the firms for which I can observe intangibles’
intensity in each year. Figure 3.16 in the Appendix shows that the coefficients for
∆IntangiblesIntensity are still significant and positive. However, the coefficients
are larger than in the unbalanced panel; this is reconcilable with the fact that
the balanced sample is a selective set of better-performing firms, and this can bias
the OLS estimate upward. Finally, these results are also very similar when the
dependent variable is the first difference between the outcome measured in any
post-treatment year and the outcome measured in 2009. Table 3.4 shows that in
fact the coefficient for intangibles’ intensity is consistently positive and the largest
29These results are not the same in the balanced panel as figure 3.17 in the Appendix shows.
30See figure 3.15 in the Appendix. Unfortunately, I could not access wages data after 2012 and
so this analysis is restricted to the 2008-2012 period.
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effect is detected in 201231.
As described in section 3.5, I replicate the analysis by employing non-parametric
methods to estimate the treatment effect. Table 3.10 shows that for intangibles’ in-
tensity the results are consistent with the ones from parametric regressions. There
is a positive and significant increase in the change in average intangibles’ intensity
in treated firms after the treatment. However, the results for patent applications
are not exactly the same as the parametric regressions. In fact, the total number
of patent applications is almost 50% lower amongst treated firms after the treat-
ment. This result is driven by the fact that the outcome is equal to 0 for almost
90% of the firms after the treatment and that there are very few firms with many
patents. In fact, I obtain similar results when looking at the extensive margin, i.e.a
binary variable for patent applications. Also, the results are always insignificant in
the year-by-year analysis32. Overall then, even if the parametric estimations do not
detect any treatment effect on patenting, the non-parametric ones by focusing on
the observations around the cut-off find a negative effect of the treatment on the
probability of patenting. All the other results of non-parametric estimations are
very similar to the ones presented and can be found in the Appendix.
3.7 Conclusion
The effectiveness of R&D public support on private firms is often ambiguous. For
this reason, governments are increasingly adopting less direct measures such as R&D
tax credit (OECD, 2017). However, young firms are believed to face higher credit
constraints and fixed costs and thus might still benefit from more direct types of
support. In this paper I study the impact of an R&D subsidy to high-tech start-ups
introduced by the Italian Government in 2009.
The features of the programme allow the implementation of an RDD as
projects were funded on the basis of a score assigned by an independent committee.
31These results are robust to the exclusion of controls, specifications with higher polynomial
orders and restriction to the balanced sample.
32Both results are available upon request.
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Table 3.3: Baseline results I : pre and post
Panel A: Average intangibles’ intensity
2008-2010 2011-16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated -0.105* -0.022 -0.041 -0.076 0.105 0.015 0.009 0.133
(0.055) (0.046) (0.047) (0.061) (0.080) (0.058) (0.064) (0.088)
Observations 350 350 350 350 322 322 322 322
R-squared 0.021 0.012 0.139 0.143 0.011 0.002 0.180 0.195
Polynomial Order 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Panel B: Total number of patent applications
up to 2010 2011-17
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated 0.075 1.211 1.158 -0.034 -0.233 0.066 0.100 -0.175
(0.911) (1.176) (1.044) (0.917) (0.190) (0.154) (0.178) (0.225)
Observations 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352
R-squared 0.010 0.004 0.232 0.239 0.010 0.007 0.188 0.191
Polynomial Order 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from parametric regressions of linear and quadratic
polynomial order. The dependent variables are the average intangibles’ intensity (panel A) and the total
number patents filed (panel B) measured over each time period. The samples are smaller than in the text
because of missing values for the industry control. The regressions include the running variable and its
interaction with the treatment, as in equation (3.1). The controls used in columns 3-4 and 6-7 are: 4-
digit NACE industry dummies, size dummies and a dummy for firms in convergence regions. The unit of
observation is a firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than
1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Figure 3.6: Intangibles’ intensity. Treatment effect by year and polyno-
mial order. These graphs plot the coefficients of the treatment effect in each
year before and after the publication of the ranking. Each chart shows the results
for different polynomial orders of the running variable and its interaction with
the treatment dummy. The unit of observation is a firm.
Figure 3.7: Treatment effect by polynomial order. These graphs plot the
coefficients of the treatment effect of the changes in outcome after the publication
of the ranking. The coefficients are plotted against the polynomial order of the
function of the running variable and its interaction with the treatment dummy.
The top chart shows the changes in intangibles’ intensity while the bottom one
shows growth rate in the number of patent applications. The unit of observation
is a firm.
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Table 3.4: Differences in discontinuity: year by year
Panel A: ∆ Intangibles’ intensity
∆ between 2009-2011 2009-2012 2009-2013 2009-2014 2009-2015 2009-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated 0.194*** 0.316*** 0.228** 0.295*** 0.240* 0.284***
(0.072) (0.080) (0.093) (0.093) (0.126) (0.099)
Observations 289 254 276 260 237 212
R-squared 0.131 0.195 0.165 0.153 0.147 0.190
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B: ∆ number of patent applications
∆ between 2009-2011 2009-2012 2009-2013 2009-2014 2009-2015 2009-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated 0.054 -0.003 0.092 0.141* 0.022 0.107
(0.152) (0.143) (0.108) (0.082) (0.078) (0.092)
Observations 334 334 334 334 334 334
R-squared 0.286 0.147 0.142 0.088 0.235 0.191
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from parametric regressions quadratic polynomial
order. The dependent variables are differences between intangibles’ intensity (panel A) and the total number
patents filed (panel B) in each post-treatment year and the variables in 2009. The regressions include the
running variable and its interaction with the treatment, as in equation (3.1). The controls used in columns
3-4 and 6-7 are: 4-digit NACE industry dummies, size dummies and a dummy for firms in convergence
regions. The unit of observation is a firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***
significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Table 3.5: Non-parametric estimation: differences in discontinuity
Panel A: Average intangibles’ intensity
Levels ∆
Pre-2011 Post-2011 Post - Pre
(1) (2) (3)
treated -0.0647 0.112 0.211**
(0.0589) (0.0835) (0.0826)
Observations 358 329 326
BW size 2.577 2.174 1.833
Panel B: Total patent applications
Levels ∆
Pre-2011 Post-2011 Post - Pre
(1) (2) (3)
treated -0.188 -0.474** -0.324
(1.121) (0.222) (1.039)
Observations 361 361 361
BW size 3.439 2.835 4.242
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from non-parametric regressions. Panel
A is for intangibles’ intensity and panel B for patents’ application. The outcome variables in
columns (1) and (2) are measured in pre and post-treatment period, respectively. Column (3)
reports the coefficient for the first difference. The treatment occurs in 2011.The optimal band-
width is the one suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) . The unit of observation is a
firm. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5
percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Most importantly, the cut-off score was unknown ex-ante and this helps to rule
out non-random sorting around it. Using balance sheet and patenting data, I find
that firms which received the subsidy have a 20% higher intangibles-to-assets ratio
than firms that did not. The effect is significant only in the two years following the
publication of the ranking and fades away later on. I find no robust evidence for
an effect on patents but non-parametric regressions suggest that treated firms have
patented less in the years following the subsidy. Finally, I find no effect on other
balance sheet entries, such as sales.
The results suggest that a large and positive effect on intangibles’ intensity.
As start-ups are more credit-constrained and also less able to secure innovative
results, this effect can be interpreted as an upper bound for larger and more mature
firms. These findings are consistent with papers that find positive effects on smaller
firms only (Lach, 2002; Bronzini and Piselli, 2016). However, the results on patenting
and other key metrics of firms performance are null. A potential interpretation of
these results is that the impact on the intensity of intangibles rather than reflecting
an increase in innovative activities might be the mechanic accounting response to the
increase in capital derived from the reception of the funds. In terms of innovation
outputs, treated firms do not patent more and, at worst, they patent less. In other
words, even if the subsidy allowed a one-shot increase in R&D investments, this
did not have positive externalities on firms’ performance or on firms’ innovative
activity in general. These findings would be consistent with previous studies that
focus on the features of innovations that are strategically made outside the patent
system (see, for instance, Moser, 2005). Also, the subsidy was targeted mainly at
the industrial development of products. Development projects are less risky, less
uncertain, less intangible and also less likely to lead to patenting (Griliches, 1986).
The results of this paper have some limitations. First, as already mentioned,
RDD requires large sample sizes to detect the local effect of the treatment. There-
fore, the statistical power of this analysis is probably too low due to the very small
number of firms applying for the grant in the first place. This also precludes het-
erogeneity analyses. Secondly, data limitations make it very hard to identify actual
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innovation. Finally, the timing of the programme might have created some distor-
tions that this work could not detect. The publication of the ranking was supposed
to occur on April 2010 but was postponed by one year until April 2011. It is very
plausible to suppose that young firms with innovative projects in mind might have
just started the investments anyway before the publication of the ranking. If sub-
sidised, they might have directed the public funds to additional projects or other
non-innovation related costs. Because of data limitations, I cannot identify the ac-
tual R&D investments of the firms and thus I cannot rule out that the subsidies




Figure 3.8: Distribution of patent applications The sample is restricted to
firms that applied at least once for a patent.














Notes: the table shows the score distribution around the cut-off.
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Figure 3.9: RD plots for production cost in the pre-treatment period
These graphs show the average of the variable within bins of score in each year of
the pre-treatment period. The variable is transformed as log(1+x). The circles
represent means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values
and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each
side of the cut-off.
Figure 3.10: RD plots for production value in the pre-treatment period
These graphs show the average of the variable within bins of score in each year of
the pre-treatment period. The variable is transformed as log(1+x). The circles
represent means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values
and 90% confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each
side of the cut-off.
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Figure 3.11: RD plots for sales in the pre-treatment period These graphs
show the average of the variable within bins of score in each year of the pre-
treatment period. The variable is transformed as log(1+x).The circles represent
means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90%
confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of
the cut-off.
Table 3.7: Optimal polynomial order
Selection criterion
AIC Bin dummies
All Treatment Control max
2008 2 2 2 2 1
2009 3 3 3 3 5
2010 3 1 3 3 5
2011 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: the table reports the optimal polynomial order obtained in each year by
the AIC and the bin dummies test suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). The
polynomial orders selected by AIC are computed on the whole sample, on the
treatment group sample, and on the control group sample. The last column
reports the maximum among those three.
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Table 3.8: Balance sheet missing values
Dummy for no missing value
Pre Post
year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated 0.0234 -0.0305 0.0759 -0.0619 -0.0602 -0.00530 0.0747 0.130
(0.0597) (0.0571) (0.0927) (0.114) (0.102) (0.111) (0.120) (0.127)
Observations 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361
R-squared 0.017 0.004 0.009 0.048 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.009
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from linear regressions. The dependent variable is
a dummy equal to one if core balance sheet data are not available for the firm in that year. The regressions
include the running variable and its interaction with the treatment, as in equation (3.1). The unit of
observation is a firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than
1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
Table 3.9: Baseline results: pre and post - Balanced panel
Panel A: Intangibles’ intensity
2008-2010 2011-16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated -0.152*** -0.082* -0.043 -0.109** 0.130 0.041 0.066 0.167*
(0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) (0.095) (0.074) (0.076) (0.098)
Observations 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181
R-squared 0.060 0.049 0.180 0.187 0.032 0.018 0.073 0.088
Polynomial Order 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Panel B: Total number of patent applications
up to 2010 2011-17
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated 0.157 0.824 1.000 0.451 -0.306 -0.017 0.106 -0.270
(1.413) (1.005) (1.077) (2.069) (0.341) (0.243) (0.218) (0.426)
Observations 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181
R-squared 0.025 0.010 0.034 0.051 0.025 0.021 0.116 0.122
Polynomial Order 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from parametric regressions of linear and quadratic
polynomial order. The dependent variables are the average intangibles’ intensity (panel A) and the total
number patents filed (panel B) measured over each time period. The samples are created by restricting
to firms with no missing values in any of the years. The regressions include the running variable and its
interaction with the treatment, as in equation (3.1). The controls used in columns 3-4 and 6-7 are: 4-
digit NACE industry dummies, size dummies and a dummy for firms in convergence regions. The unit of
observation is a firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than
1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
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Table 3.10: Non-parametric estimation: difference in discontinuity II
∆ Intangibles’ intensity ∆ Patents’ applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treated 0.211** 0.341*** -0.277 -0.401
(0.0826) (0.105) (1.037) (0.992)
Observations 320 181 352 181
Balanced panel NO YES NO YES
BW size 1.832 1.988 3.906 3.849
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from non-parametric regressions. The outcome
variables are the changes in intangibles’ intensity and patents’ application between the pre- and post-
treatment period. The treatment occurs in 2011.The optimal bandwidth is the one suggested by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) . The unit of observation is a firm. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant
at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
Table 3.11: Non-parametric estimation: year by year I
Intangibles’ intensity
Panel A: Unbalanced panel
year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated -0.113 -0.0121 0.0282 0.221** 0.199** 0.201* 0.106 0.0740
(0.0738) (0.0794) (0.0920) (0.0901) (0.0962) (0.103) (0.101) (0.0895)
Observations 341 343 308 264 292 275 250 224
BW size 2.225 2.225 2.225 2.225 2.225 2.225 2.225 2.225
Panel B: Balanced panel
year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated -
0.274***
-0.0398 0.0357 0.184* 0.153 0.138 0.183 0.112
(0.0934) (0.0978) (0.118) (0.100) (0.117) (0.122) (0.125) (0.0999)
Observations 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
BW size 2.218 2.218 2.218 2.218 2.218 2.218 2.218 2.218
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from non-parametric regressions in each year.
The outcome variable is intangibles’ intensity. The treatment occurs in 2011.The optimal bandwidth is
computed in 2009 and is the one suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) . Panel A reports results
on the unbalanced sample. Panel B reports results on the balanced sample. The unit of observation is a
firm. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *
significant at 10 percent.
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Table 3.12: Non-parametric estimation: year by year II
Patents’ applications
Panel A: Unbalanced panel
year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated -0.493 -0.357 -0.0756 -0.180* -0.101 0.0300 -0.0349 -0.113
(0.379) (0.263) (0.0772) (0.106) (0.114) (0.0301) (0.0271) (0.0882)
Observations 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361
BW size 2.850 2.850 2.850 2.850 2.850 2.850 2.850 2.850
Panel B: Balanced panel
year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treated -0.540 -0.0458 -0.151 -0.0932 -0.252 0.0386 -0.0233 -0.105
(0.592) (0.169) (0.114) (0.152) (0.179) (0.0566) (0.0258) (0.105)
Observations 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
BW size 3.505 3.505 3.505 3.505 3.505 3.505 3.505 3.505
Notes: the table reports estimates of the treatment effect from non-parametric regressions in each year. The
outcome variable is the number of patent applications filed in each year. The treatment occurs in 2011.The
optimal bandwidth is computed in 2009 and is the one suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) . Panel
A reports results on the unbalanced sample. Panel B reports results on the balanced sample. The unit of
observation is a firm. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at less than 1 percent; ** significant
at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
138
Figure 3.12: RD plots These graphs show the average of the variable within
bins of score in each year of the pre-treatment period. The circles represent
means within 10% bins and the lines and shaded areas are fitted values and 90%
confidence intervals based on a quadratic polynomial regression on each side of
the cut-off.
Figure 3.13: Intangibles’ intensity. Treatment effect by polynomial or-
der These graphs plot the coefficients of the treatment effect in the pre (2008-
2010) and post (2011-2016) period, against polynomial orders of the running
variable. The running variable is interacted with the treatment dummy to allow
for different polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The unit of observation is a
firm.
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Figure 3.14: Total number of patent applications. Treatment effect by
polynomial order These graphs plot the coefficients of the treatment effect in
the pre and post period, against polynomial orders of the running variable. The
running variable is interacted with the treatment dummy to allow for different
polynomials on each side of the cut-off. The unit of observation is a firm.
Figure 3.15: Log of wages. Treatment effect by year and polynomial
order. These graphs plot the coefficients of the treatment effect in each year
before and after the publication of the ranking (only up to 2012 because of data
limitation). Each chart shows the results for different polynomial orders of the
running variable and its interaction with the treatment dummy. The unit of
observation is a firm.
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Figure 3.16: Treatment effect by polynomial order - Balanced panel.
These graphs plot the coefficients of the treatment effect of the changes in out-
come after the publication of the ranking. The coefficients are plotted against the
polynomial order of the function of the running variable and its interaction with
the treatment dummy. The top chart shows the changes in intangibles’ intensity
while the bottom one shows growth rate in the number of patent applications.
The sample is restricted to the balanced panel. The unit of observation is a firm.
Figure 3.17: Intangibles’ intensity. Treatment effect by year and poly-
nomial order - Balanced panel These graphs plot the coefficients of the treat-
ment effect in each year before and after the publication of the ranking. Each
chart shows the results for different polynomial orders of the running variable and
its interaction with the treatment dummy. The sample is the balanced panel. The
unit of observation is a firm.
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ernment programs can improve local labor markets: Evidence from state en-
terprise zones, federal empowerment zones and federal enterprise community.”
Journal of Public Economics 95 (7-8):779–797.
Howell, Sabrina T. 2017. “Financing innovation: evidence from R&D grants.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 107 (4):1136–64.
Ilzetzki, Ethan. 2011. “Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality.” Journal
of Development Economics 96 (1):30 – 46.
Imbens, Guido and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2012. “Optimal bandwidth choice
for the regression discontinuity estimator.” The Review of economic studies
79 (3):933–959.
148
Imbens, Guido W and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. “Regression discontinuity designs:
A guide to practice.” Journal of econometrics 142 (2):615–635.
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Muraközy, Balázs and Álmos Telegdy. 2016. “Political incentives and state subsidy
allocation: Evidence from Hungarian municipalities.” European Economic Review
89:324–344.
151
Nagaoka, Sadao, Kazuyuki Motohashi, and Akira Goto. 2010. “Patent statistics as
an innovation indicator.” In Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, vol. 2.
Elsevier, 1083–1127.
Nelson, Richard R. 1959. “The simple economics of basic scientific research.” Journal
of political economy 67 (3):297–306.
Neumark, David and Helen Simpson. 2015. “Chapter 18 - Place-Based Policies.”
In Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Handbook of Regional and Ur-
ban Economics, vol. 5, edited by Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson, and
William C. Strange. Elsevier, 1197 – 1287.
OECD. 2016. “OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database.”
———. 2017. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2017.
OpenStreetMap contributors. 2017. “Planet dump retrieved from
https://planet.osm.org .”
Pack, Howard and Kamal Saggi. 2006. The case for industrial policy: a critical
survey. The World Bank.
Papagni, Erasmo, Amedeo Lepore, Emanuele Felice, Anna Laura Baraldi, and
Maria Rosaria Alfano. 2018. “Public Investment and Growth Accelerations: The
Case of Southern Italy, 1951-1995.” Eeri research paper series, Economics and
Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
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